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This dissertation studies the daily institutional investors trading patterns before and 
after public news announcements in the US equity market, such as Merger and 
Acquisition announcement and release of macroeconomic indicators. Do institutional 
investors have inside information, or do they have superior models before news 
announcement? Using a high frequency institutional trading dataset that combines 
intraday NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) data with the quarterly institutional 
ownership report (13F) by a reduced-form model, this dissertation tests the hypothesis 
of institutional investors trading on inside information 1993 to 2004. I find that most 
institutional investors are informed traders who accumulate shares before good news 
or before takeover announcements as early as 30 days ahead. Institutional investors do 
not have superior models in that they only buy the actual future targets and sell the 
forecasted “rumor” stocks from an acquisition probability model. By reversing their 
positions on and after the announcement day, they realize positive profits. Further, I 
confirm that the pre-event trading pattern of institutional investors is associated with 
stocks that have high probability of informed trading. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
INSTITUTITIONAL TRADING AROUND MERGER 
AND ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
“We certainly see institutional-type accounts that have come into the market 
with extraordinarily good timing on a repeat basis; we have investigated those. But to 
get the evidence to prove a violation of the statute under which we allege insider 
trading is difficult.” 
           
- Joseph J. Cella, Chief of the Office of Market 
                            Surveillance at the US S.E.C., August 2006 
 
The US financial market has long had strict insider trading laws to restrain such 
behavior and insure market fairness and integrity1. However, it is a difficult task to 
find empirical proof of illegal behavior, especially when it is difficult to distinguish it 
from legitimate market participation. An article in the August 27, 2006 edition of the 
New York Times, titled “Whispers of mergers set off suspicious trading,” describes an 
investigation by an analytical research firm, Measuredmarkets Inc., of the nation’s 
largest mergers over a 12-month period. Its results show that the securities of 41 
percent of the companies receiving buyout bids exhibited abnormal and suspicious 
                                                 
1 Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) have shown that insider trading increases cost of equity in many 
countries, and that the enforcement of insider trading law decreases cost of equity.  
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 trading in the days and weeks before those deals became public.   
 
Section 13(F) of the Securities Act of 1934 (1978 amendment) requires 
institutional investment managers with investment discretion of $100 million or more 
of certain equity securities to disclose equity holdings on the final day of each quarter. 
According to the SEC, “The purpose of this disclosure requirement is to collect and 
disseminate to the public information about the holdings and investment activities of 
institutional money managers in order to assist investors, issuers and government 
regulators.”2 Such information can be used by the SEC to analyze the influence and 
impact of institutional investment managers on the securities market. As Joseph Cella 
of the SEC points out, institutional-type investors are among the major concerns of 
security market investigators for possible non-legitimate trading based on material 
non-public information3. However, the low frequency of this quarterly filing 
requirement makes it difficult to capture any suspicious quick entry-and-exit 
executions by institutions in a short term. This is especially true in the case of 
corporate specific events where short-term profits are significant, such as merger and 
acquisition announcements, earnings announcements, changes in dividend policy and 
seasonal equity offerings.  
 
Among all corporate events, Merger and Acquisition (M&A) are particularly 
interesting because they are supposedly unknown to the market, apart from a small 
group of insiders, before they are announced. In a takeover bid, the acquiring firm 
usually pays a high premium to buy the target firm stocks. The potential profits drive a 
                                                 
2 In the Matter of Quattro Capital Management, LLC, August 15, 2007. 
3 A report of SEC shows that in prosecution of insider trading and market-timing cases, 25% cases are 
institutions and 75% cases are individuals. 
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 substantial amount of efforts to collect information and predict possible takeover 
targets. Results in this paper also show that predicting takeover targets will not make 
money unless you know exactly which one is going to be acquired. Institutional 
trading on possible future targets such as rival firms shows that institutions sell these 
targets and only buy the target firms that actually are taken over in the future 30 to 40 
days.   
 
Usually takeover deals involve companies, management-led buyout teams, 
private equity firms, large shareholders, and brokerage firms which have diverse 
businesses under one roof. Institutional investors are well-positioned to gain access to 
these information venues; therefore, any significant trading patterns a priori are 
suspected of capitalizing on inside information. Results of this paper show that there 
exist serial leaders such as brokerage firms who can consistently identify future target 
firms and accumulate shares in advance, a phenomenon that is consistent with their 
business position and information venue.  
 
Previous studies on M&A document price run-ups and increased trading 
volume of target firms before announcements; however, it is still debatable whether 
pre-announcement trading involves trading on insider information or legitimate 
market participation. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) find that the abnormal returns prior 
to announcements are related to inside information leakage. Meulbroek (1992) 
observes a positive link between target firm price run-ups and days of prosecuted 
insider trading.  Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) investigate pre-bid run-up from 1981 to 
1985 and conclude that pre-bid market activity is mostly due to rumors. An immediate 
question is: who are responsible for the price and volume run-ups prior to takeovers – 
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 institutions, individuals, or corporate insiders? Barclay and Warner (1993) find that 
medium-sized trades contribute to most of the price impact prior to takeovers. 
Chakravarty (2001), using a sample of NYSE firms, also finds that medium-size 
trades, which come from institutional investors, are most informative.  Griffin, Shu 
and Topaloglu (2007) document that, in NASDAQ-listed target firms, individual 
investors build up net buying positions, while institutions mostly provide liquidity 
before takeovers. My paper provides empirical tests on whether institutional investors 
are well-informed prior to takeover bids by investigating their trading behavior before 
and after M&A announcements, for all target firms listed on the NYSE and AMEX 
from 1993 to 2004.  
  
Specifically, I address five issues in this paper: First, do institutional investors 
exhibit significant trading imbalances (buy-sell) before and after M&A 
announcements? Second, I examine whether the abnormal trading volume by 
institutions is market participation or profit exploitation. If there is market-wide 
information leakage prior to the event, I expect to see immediate price jumps that 
incorporate such information, in which buyers of target firms are legitimate market 
participants. However, if there were no significant price jumps in the target firm stocks 
a priori – therefore no market-wide information leakage – any significant 
accumulation of target firm stocks by institutional investors becomes suspicious.4 
                                                 
4 We are not saying that a run-up pattern in CAR is not consistent with a market where informed trading 
exists. In reality, the run-up that we observe in the sample with all firms is probably due to informed 
trading and rumors/leakage. Moreover, when we talk about "market-wide information leakage", we are 
not talking about everyone knowing for sure that you will have an M&A, in which case you will indeed 
have "an immediate jump in the price". Rather, when we say "market-wide information leakage", we 
are talking about rumors which will lead to a run-up as some uninformed traders start speculating on the 
possibility of an M&A. Most of those uninformed traders end up losing money since many M&A 
rumors turn out to be incorrect (Gao and Oler (2007)) 
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 Third, which types of institutional investors are more likely to learn material non-
public information – banks, mutual funds, brokerage firms, or insurance companies? 
Fourth, how do we distinguish institutions trading based on inside information from 
trading on their superior models? Can we further identify suspicious serial leaders who 
can consistently predict future M&A deals? Finally, is the significant front-running 
pattern of institutional investors associated with higher degree of information 
asymmetry among target firms? I use the probability of informed trading (PIN), 
developed by Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1997), as a proxy to measure the degree of 
information asymmetry and relate this PIN measure to the cross-sectional level of 
institutional trading imbalances over the event period.  
 
The major findings of this paper are as follows: First, institutional investors 
start to accumulate shares in target firms as early as 30 trading days before an event, 
with statistically significant buying positions starting around day (-16). Average 
institutional abnormal net buying orders, as measured by daily net imbalances in 
excess of the average daily net imbalances over the entire sample period,  have an 
arch shape over a [-30, +40] day window. Normally we expect investors to sell their 
stocks immediately on an announcement day to cash in, but, among all institutional 
investors, brokerage firms mostly act as merger arbitragers who either hold their 
positions or buy more shares on and after the event day, to speculate on the final deal 
consummation. By doing this, merger arbitragers provide liquidity at a market price 
that is lower than the proposed acquiring price, due to the possibility of takeover 
failure.   
 
On an announcement day, most institutional investors (except investment 
 5
 advisors) immediately reverse their trading positions to capitalize on their prior 
information, a pattern that is consistent with the theoretical model developed by 
Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1994), in which some investors receive 
private information before others. In their model, “in a partially revealing rational 
expectations equilibrium, investors who discover information early trade aggressively 
in the initial period and then partially reverse their trades in the next trading round, 
when the trades of the investors who become informed at this later date cause the price 
to more fully reflect the investors’ information.” This paper provides empirical 
evidence for their model, in which institutional investors reveal the pattern of early 
informed investors who are “short-term profit takers”. Just as Cella from S.E.C market 
surveillance points out, “We certainly see institutional-type accounts that have come 
into the market with extraordinarily good timing on a repeat basis.” 
 
Second, I find that there is no market-wide information leakage a priori, and 
private information is revealed through the trading process between informed 
institutional investors and uninformed investors.5  More interestingly, I find that 
target firms that are bought and sold by institutional investors do not show any 
significant price run-ups before takeover bids, which implies that there is no market-
wide information leakage prior to announcements – therefore there is no rumor which 
will lead to a run-up as some uninformed traders start speculating on the possibility of 
an M&A. Most of those uninformed traders end up losing money since many M&A 
                                                 
5 According to Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) and Kyle (1985), in a market with informed traders, 
private information is revealed through a trading process in which uninformed traders learn the 
information signal by updating their posterior beliefs on the underlying price after each trade. At the 
point of equilibrium, price is fully or partially revealed. If the information becomes market-wide at any 
point, price will jump immediately to a level that fully reveals the information.  
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 rumors turn out to be incorrect.6 One possible explanation for this is that institutional 
investors, although informed early, have more constraints and do not trade 
aggressively to induce possible price impacts. In fact I find that abnormal trading 
imbalances only account for 0.5% to 2% of the average daily trading volume. An 
alternative explanation is that institutions are better able to hide their trades, e.g., 
through algorithmic trading or breaking large trades into smaller ones that will not 
impact prices.   
 
Third, although institutional investors are not a homogeneous group in terms of 
trading strategies, regulations, and information venues, I find, surprisingly, that they 
show very similar trading patterns around an event, with the exception of brokerage 
firms. All institutions have net buying imbalances before an announcement, and all but 
brokerage firms immediately sell their shares on and after an announcement day. 
Brokerage firms tend to be merger arbitragers in that they continue to buy more target 
firm stocks to speculate on final deal consummation. Merger arbitragers provide 
liquidity to the market at a price lower than the announced takeover price, therefore 
bearing the risk of failure by speculating on deal consummation. If the deal turns out 
to be successful, merger arbitragers sell these shares at their full premium price to the 
acquirers.  
 
Fourth, the hypothesis of superior models is rejected in favor of inside 
information. Following the acquisition probability theory of Song and Walking 
(2000), I construct a prediction model to forecast future takeover targets such as rival 
                                                 
6 Gao and Oler (2007) show that buying on rumor target firms will actually lose money.   
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 firms and examine institutional trading flow on these forecasted targets before M&A 
announcement. The trading pattern shows that they are selling these rival firms but 
only buying actual target firms over a 50 to 60 days period ahead, which indicates that 
institutional investors have a better information venue to anticipate the firms that 
actually become targets later, rather than use models to speculate on possible 
takeovers. Further, I find the quarterly holding position changes of some institutional 
investors have explanatory power in the prediction of the likelihood of future M&A 
deals. These institutions are serial leaders who can consistently identify actual target 
firms and start to accumulate shares as far as four to five quarters ahead, a pattern that 
is consistent with their behavior in the short-term window with daily data. These serial 
leaders are mostly brokerage firms, mutual fund and banks, whose positions and 
profits are much larger in magnitude than non-serial leader institutions. After the 
announcements, brokerage firms continue to hold or buy more of the shares for one or 
two quarters until final deal consummation, consistent with my conjecture in high 
frequency data that they act as merger arbitragers.  
 
Finally, using the probability of informed trading (PIN) as a proxy to measure 
a cross-sectional degree of information asymmetry, I find that contemporaneously, the 
significant front-running pattern of institutional investors is associated with a high 
probability of informed trading, as they both use trading imbalances to proximate 
trading on private information. Moreover, when I sort target firms by previous year’s 
PIN, I find that firms in general are characterized by different degree of information 
asymmetry exhibit similar patterns of systematic front-running patterns of institutions.  
 
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 briefly reviews related 
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 literature. Section 1.3 describes data and methodology. Section 1.4 discusses results. 
Section 1.5 concludes and suggests directions for further research.  
 
1.2 Literature Review 
 
The 2007 Institutional Investment Report, published annually by the United States 
Global Corporate Governance Research Center, shows that US institutional assets 
have risen to $24.1 trillion in 2005 from $7.6 trillion in 1990 and $19.7 trillion in 
2000. In 2005, institutional holdings accounted for 61.2 percent of the US equity 
market and 67.9 percent of the ownership of the largest 1,000 U.S. firms. With such a 
large stake at hand, the trading behavior of institutional investors has been of extreme 
interest to academics in recent years. This is a question that can only be answered 
through empirical investigation, though there is very limited public data available.  
 
Empirical studies on institutional investors have focused on two aspects - their 
preference for choosing stocks cross-sectionally, and their trading behavior either over 
long- or short-term corporate events. The first aspect has been studied extensively. For 
example, Gompers and Metrick (2001) show that institutional investors prefer large 
and liquid stocks that have low past returns. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) show that 
institutions do not like firms that increase dividend payout, but prefer firms that 
increase share repurchase. Kumar (2005) finds that institutions exhibit an aversion for 
idiosyncratic skewness but prefer systematic skewness.  
 
Investigation of the institutional investors’ trading behavior around events is 
quite limited by the low frequency of publicly available data in the US equity market. 
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 Most studies use the institutional ownership report that is filed with the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission for end-of-quarter stock holdings. Using this quarterly 
data, Gibson, Safieddine and Sonti (2004) study the relationship between changes in 
institutional investment and returns of seasonal-equity-offering firms at the time of 
issuance. Yan and Zhang (2006) shows that short-term institutional investors are better 
informed. Burch and Swaminathan (2002) examine the trading behavior of institutions 
in response to earnings news. Dennis and Weston (2001) study the relationship 
between institutional ownership changes and the probability of informed trading. Field 
(1995) concludes that IPO firms with higher institutional investment perform well in 
the three-year period after the IPO. Bushee and Goodman (2007) investigate whether 
institutions trade based on private information about earnings news and returns. 
However, some results of these studies might fail to capture any intra-quarter 
covariance between institutional flow and corporate news release due to the low 
frequency of quarterly data.  
 
Some recent papers have used proprietary datasets that provide high-frequency 
institutional trading flows.  Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman (2008) construct a unique 
dataset using the  NYSE’s Consolidated Equity Audit Trail Data (CAUD) file, which 
contains a field called Account Type that specifies the origination of each order – an 
institution or an individual. They study the trading of individuals and institutions 
around earnings announcements and find that institutions are news-momentum traders. 
Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) investigate the trades of NASDAQ 100 firms 
with a special classification field of individuals, institutions, and market-makers. They 
find a strong positive relation between institutional trading and short-term past stock 
returns, both daily and intraday. Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001), Froot and 
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 Teo (2007), and O’Connell and Teo (2007) use custodial data from State Street 
Corporation to study daily institutional trading behavior. They find that institutional 
flows are positively related to future stock returns, and institutions take on more risk 
following an increase in net profit and loss. These studies are difficult to replicate, and 
their samples are restricted by both time period and the coverage of institutional 
investors.  
 
Another group of papers attempts to use publicly available data from the 
NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) to examine institutional trading behavior at a high 
frequency level. Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) suggest a separating rule by dollar 
trading size above or below certain threshold values to distinguish order flows of 
institutional investors from those of individual investors. They find that a $20,000 
cutoff most effectively classifies institutional trades in small stocks. Shanthikumar 
(2004) uses their method to study institutional trading around earnings 
announcements, and finds evidence that large traders react strongly to an earnings 
surprise and capitalize on earnings announcement drift. However, Campbell, 
Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2008) find that the Lee-Radhakrishna approach of defining 
institutional trading works poorly when benchmarked against the quarterly report of 
institutional ownership positions in 13F.  
 
To study the dynamics of daily institutional trading behavior using non- 
proprietary data, Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2008) develop a methodology 
to infer the daily trading flows of institutional investors based on the publicly 
available high frequency NYSE Trades and Quotes (TAQ) data and the quarterly 
changes in institutional ownership positions on the 13F report. They show that their 
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 methodology is better than simple cutoff rules since inferred daily institutional trading 
flows are more consistent with reported quarterly institutional ownership changes. 
This paper follows Campbell-Ramadorai-Schwartz methodology (CRS thereafter) 
with some modifications to incorporate different trading strategies from different 
fiduciary types of institutional investors.  
 
Literature on high-frequency institutional trading behavior around corporate 
events focuses on exploring the post-earnings-announcement-drift (PEAD) 
phenomenon. Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2008) examine whether daily 
institutional investor trading contributes to PEAD and find that institutional investors 
generate short-term loss in demand for liquidity, but that they anticipate earnings 
surprises and PEAD to make longer-term profits.  Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman 
(2007) study institutional and individual trading behavior and PEAD. Using a unique 
dataset from NYSE, they find that institutions sell stocks with higher earnings 
uncertainty, and trade for liquidity reasons, and that the contrarian trading behavior of 
individuals after a news announcement may contribute to PEAD. Rosa, To, and Walter 
(2007) examine UK fund managers’ daily trading behavior around M&A 
announcements and find that they trade principally on perceived good news. Ashraf 
and Jayaraman (2007) study institutional investors’ holding and trading behavior in 
acquiring firm stocks in response to M&A announcements. However, their use of the 
quarterly 13F report does not show whether institutions are reacting to corporate news 
a few days before and after M&A announcements to exploit huge price premiums. The 
short length of an event window is important since it is critical to determining whether 
they obtain an informational advantage for these firms. Griffin, Shu, and Topaloglu 
(2007) examine institutional investors’ trading before takeover events for NASDAQ-
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 listed target firms and find that institutional investors are small net sellers, and that 
their trading cannot predict takeover premiums. Hasbrouck (1991a,b) uses a VAR 
decomposition to show that there is a permanent price impact of information-driven 
trading ahead of an M&A announcement. Huang and Walkling (1987), using a simple 
market model to compute abnormal returns, find that average abnormal returns for 
target firms in their sample of 1977 to 1982 are positive starting from 50 days ahead. 
 
Do institutional investors possess a comparative informational advantage in 
anticipating M&A events and trade in advance to exploit large price premiums on 
target firms that they own? Is there heterogeneity among institutional investors with 
respect to skills, trading strategies, and information? This paper fills the gap in the 
literature.  
 
1.3 Data and Methodology 
 
1.3.1 Data 
 
Four data sources are used in this study: the NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ), the 
Thomson Financial Institutional Ownership report (13F), CRSP, and the 
SDC/Spectrum Merger and Acquisition database from Jan 1, 1993 to Dec 31, 2004.  
I start my sample from 1993, when the NYSE TAQ data becomes available. I include 
all common stocks of target firms that are traded on the NYSE or AMEX7, and 
                                                 
7 Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara (2000) show that in NASDAQ, the use of trade classification rules such as 
those in Lee and Ready (2000), introduce biases in classifying large trades and trades initiated during a 
high volume period, which is the case that I investigate here. Therefore, I do not include the NASDAQ 
stocks in my sample.  
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 exclude all close-end funds, American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and Real Estate 
Investment Trusts (REITs). My final sample contains 1,638 target firms.  
 
The NYSE TAQ data includes all trades and quotes during normal trading 
hours on common stocks and excludes all close-end funds, ADRs, and REITs. To 
classify the direction of a transaction, Lee and Ready (1991) develop an algorithm that 
compares transaction price to posted bid and ask quotes. If the price of a trade is 
higher (lower) than the mid-point of the contemporaneous bid-ask quote, the trade is 
classified as a buy (sell). If they are equal, the algorithm classifies trades on an up-tick 
as buys, and those on a downtick as sells. All zero-tick trades that cannot be identified 
as buy or sell, plus the cancelled trades or batched or split-up trades that cannot be 
classified by the Lee-Ready algorithm are put into a separate bin of unclassifiable 
trades.  For details on the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm, see Appendix A.  
 
Institutional investment managers who exercise investment discretion of $100 
million or more must report to the SEC their end-of-quarter stock holdings on Form 
13F. In general, an institutional investment manager is: (1) an entity that invests in, or 
buys and sells, securities for its own account; or (2) a person or an entity that exercises 
investment discretion over the account of any other person or entity. Thomson 
Financial distributes a digital database of institutional quarterly 13F filings, and 
decomposes institutional ownership structures into five groups: (1) banks, (2) 
insurance companies, (3) investment companies (mutual funds), (4) investment 
advisors (major brokerage firms), (5) others, including pension funds and university 
endowments.  This categorization is not always precise; for example, if a brokerage 
firm has a mutual fund subsidiary that makes up over 50 percent of total 13F assets 
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 under management, then this firm falls into category (3) (Gompers and Metrick 
(2001)).8 The quarterly frequency of this dataset is the major drawback for any short-
window event studies. To remedy this issue, I follow procedures developed by 
Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2008) with some modifications to infer daily 
trading flows from each type of institution, combining their quarterly holding changes 
with NYSE TAQ data.  
 
CRSP daily files provide the daily common stock share price, number of 
shares outstanding, exchange codes, stock returns, value-weighted, and equal-
weighted market returns, etc. I use CRSP PERMNO to match CRSP data to TAQ and 
13F stocks that are traded on the NYSE and AMEX. 
 
The Merger and Acquisition data is from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC) database provided by Thomson Financial. My sample covers merger 
announcements for US public firms from Jan 1, 1993 to Dec 31, 2004, excluding all 
closed-end funds, ADRs, and REITs. To be consistent with my institutional trading 
data, I choose US target firms that are only trading on the NYSE or AMEX, and, 
particularly, firms that were owned by institutional investors before events.  
 
 
                                                 
8 According to Thomson Financial Data Specifications, during the integration with the former 
Technimetrics, the institutional classification mapping was changed and merged with the mapping from 
Technimetrics. This resulted in a mapping error. Consequently, numerous institutions added to the 
“Type 5” category that should not have been since year 1999. Moreover, between the end of 1998 and 
the first quarter of 1999, there are errors where Type 2 codes were indexed as Type 5 ("All Others").  
Neither problem has been corrected and unfortunately they will not be corrected in the feed files, 
according to Thomson Financials. At this moment we cannot get a better classification than what 
Thomson Financial has to offer; therefore there will be lots of noise in Type 5 institutional ownership 
holdings after year 1999.   
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1.3.2 Abnormal Returns 
 
Following literature standards, I use two methods to compute abnormal returns, and 
they give qualitatively the same results9.  
 
First, the abnormal return of stock i over the event window is defined as the 
difference between the daily stock return and the CRSP value-weighted market index 
return: 
 
mtitit rrAR −=                                     (1) 
 
Where ri is the return on firm i on day t and rm is the CRSP value-weighted market 
index return.  
 
Second, I use a simple market model to estimate expected stock returns as the 
benchmark returns over the non-announcement period [-250, -31], and compute 
abnormal returns during the event window [-30, +30]:  
 
itmtiiit RR εβα +⋅+=                      (2) 
 
Where t is from day -250 to day -31. The abnormal return for stock i is then defined 
as: 
                                                 
9 For short-window event studies, daily returns are relatively small so that results will not significantly 
improve by using market and risk adjusted models. Robustness test using market and risk adjusted 
models show that the results are qualitatively the same.  
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 )( ititit RERAR −=                   (3) 
Where E(Rit) is the expected returns for stock i that are estimated from equation (2),  
t is from day -30 to day +30. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) from time t1 to t2 
(i.e., horizon length L = t2-t1+1) is defined as: 
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A standard test statistic is the CAR divided by an estimate of its standard deviation.  
There are alternative ways to estimate this standard deviation in the literature10 
(Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997). The test statistic is given by:  
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1.3.3 Daily Abnormal Trading  
 
Institutional investors report their equity holding positions to the SEC at each quarter-
end on form 13F, so past studies have relied on this quarterly data to measure 
institutional trading. However, the low frequency of this dataset does not capture 
anything within quarters, especially when there are significant events happening 
within several days. Other studies have used proprietary data11. To get a better 
                                                 
10 Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) have shown that, in short-horizon event studies, an alternative test 
using standardized abnormal returns (first estimate the standard deviation of abnormal returns using 
time-series return data for each firm, then divide each estimated abnormal return with the standard 
deviation) makes little difference with the simple test statistic here.  
11 For example, Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman (2007), Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003), Froot, 
O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001), Froot and Teo (2007), and O’Connell and Teo (2007).  
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 understanding of institutional trading behavior using publicly available data, I 
combine the 13F quarterly data with high frequency NYSE TAQ data to infer the daily 
equity holding positions of institutional investors. I follow a regression methodology 
developed by Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2008) (CRS thereafter). I apply 
some modifications to incorporate the investment strategies of different fiduciary 
types of institutional investors.  The CRS methodology is better than simple cutoff 
rules in two ways: first, it does not suffer any selection bias or restrictions by using 
high-frequency proprietary database; second, the daily institutional trading flows are 
more consistent with the reported quarterly institutional ownership changes.  
 
 To implement the CRS methodology, I collect the NYSE TAQ intraday data 
from 1993 to 2004 and use the Lee-Ready algorithm to classify the direction of each 
trade – buy, sell or unclassified. Next, I categorize each buy/sell/unclassified 
transaction by dollar size into 19 bins with lower cutoffs: $0, $2000, $3000, $5000, 
$7000, $9000, $10,000, $20,000, $30,000, $50,000, $70,000, $90,000, $100,000, 
$200,000, $300,000, $500,000, $700,000, $900,000, and $1 million. Third, I aggregate 
all shares traded in each buy/sell/unclassified bin to daily frequency, and normalize 
each daily bin by the daily shares outstanding as reported in CRSP. Finally, I 
aggregate normalized daily buy/sell/unclassified volume to the quarterly frequency.12  
 
The change in the quarterly level of institutional ownership for a stock can be 
explained by a regression on past changes and levels of institutional shares for the 
stock, and the buy/sell/ unclassifiable volume in all 19 trade-size bins during the 
quarter, restricting the coefficient on buy and sell volume to be equal and opposite: 
                                                 
12 For complete details, refer to Appendix B.  
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Where, Yi,t is the share of firm i that is owned by institutions at the end of quarter t, 
is the change of institutional ownership between quarter t and t-1, UtiY ,Δ i,t is 
unclassifiable total trading volume, BBi,t is total buy volume, Si,t is total sell volume in 
stock i during quarter t (all variables are expressed as percentages of the end-of-
quarter t shares outstanding of stock i), Fi,t = Bi,t – Si,t , and Z indexes trade size bins. 
Table I shows the regression results. 
 
To reduce the number of coefficients to be estimated yet still be able to capture 
the shape suggested by the unrestricted specifications, I use the Nelson and Siegel 
(1987) exponential smoothing function, following the CRS paper. This method 
requires estimating a function ),( itvZβ that varies with trade size Z and an interaction 
variable vit, and is of the form:  
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function using nonlinear least squares, searching over different values of τ , to select 
the function that maximizes the R2 statistics: 
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I estimate the equation separately for each quintile of market capitalization 
using the level of lagged institutional ownership (Yi,t-1) as interaction variable v.  The 
standard errors are robust in presence of heteroscedasticity (White’s correction), 
autocorrelation (Newey-West), and cross-sectional correlation, following procedures 
suggested in Petersen (2007). Clustering by firms, clustering by time, and adjusted 
Fama-MacBeth method all give similar results13.  
 
 
Following CRS, I construct the daily institutional flows in a similar equation: 
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The assumption for aggregating daily institutional flow equation (9) up to the 
quarterly frequency equation (8) is that “the error in measured daily institutional 
ownership idε is uncorrelated at all leads and lags within a quarter with all of the right 
hand side variables in equation (9). This exogeneity assumption guarantees that the 
parameters of the daily function b01, b02, b11, b12, b21, b22 andτ(parameter in g1(Z) and 
g2(Z)) be the same as those estimated at the quarterly frequency.”14  From equation 
(8) I estimate the parameters and recover the parameters of equation (9), then finally 
                                                 
13 When regressing changes of quarterly ownership on buy/sell/unclassified volume, I include lags of 
ownership, and try clustering by quarters and clustering by firms. The results are qualitatively the same. 
14 Campbell, Ramadorai and Schwartz (2008). 
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 construct the predicted value Ed[ idYΔ ] for each stock i for each day d, as a percentage 
of CRSP daily shares outstanding. I multiply this by the CRSP daily shares 
outstanding to get my institutional daily flow measure – Daily Net Buying Dollar 
Imbalance.  To avoid ad-hoc assumptions, the quarterly parameters (ρ, φ, α and ε) are 
not incorporated into the daily level, so the values of these parameters are set to zero at 
daily level. I repeat the same procedures for different institutional types and different 
firm sizes. 
  
I construct the daily abnormal institutional trading flows by an imbalance 
measure in excess of a benchmark. I define the institutional daily trading imbalance 
measure IMBi,t as the daily net buy (buy – sell) dollar volume normalized by average 
daily dollar volume in calendar year t.  The institutional abnormal daily trading 
imbalance ABIMBi,t is the daily trading imbalance in excess of the average daily 
trading imbalance over the entire sample period.15  
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         (10) 
 
Alternatively, I use another common practice in the literature: 
 
 
                                                 
15 There is an increasing trend in daily trading imbalance over the long term, since institutions have 
increased their shares of stocks over time, as shown by Gompers and Metrick (2001). But subtracting 
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Where, the institutional daily imbalance of stock i is defined as the daily net buying 
imbalances divided by the CRSP daily shares outstanding of stock i at day t. The 
abnormal daily imbalance of stock i is defined as the difference between the daily 
imbalance and the average daily imbalance over entire sample period, then multiply by 
the CRSP daily shares outstanding.  
 
I construct similar measures of daily abnormal trading imbalances for five 
quartiles of market capitalization, and for each type of institutional investors: (1) 
banks, (2) insurance companies, (3) investment companies (mutual funds), (4) 
investment advisors (major brokerage firms), (5) others, including pension funds and 
university endowments.  
 
1.3.4 Is It Inside Information or Better Model? 
 
As sophisticated investors, institutions can easily argue that their models work better 
in predicting future M&A deals, not that they obtain inside information. Following the 
acquisition probability hypothesis of Song and Walking (2000), I construct a 
prediction model of possible takeover targets and examine the trading flow of 
                                                                                                                                            
the mean of a trending variable does not affect my results. I also subtract the time trend for robustness 
and it does not affect my results, either. 
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 institutional investors on these firms16. The predicted takeover targets consist of rival 
firms in the same industry (four-digit SIC code) once the first M&A deal is announced 
after a dormant period of 13 months. If institutional investors accumulate shares in 
these rival firms with same pattern as in the actual targets, it indicates that they do not 
have inside information but only superior models to speculate on future targets. On the 
other hand, if the institutional investors trading patterns are indeed different, it 
indicates that they are more likely to have inside information.  
 
 If the institutional investors do have inside information on the actual future 
targets, their trading positions will have prediction power on the likelihood of future 
M&A announcements. If an institution happens to know a firm becomes a target by 
random lottery or by assigning equal probabilities to the firms they own, it is not 
inside information. If an institution can consistently predict the future M&A deals and 
accumulate holding positions in these targets several quarters ahead with a 
surprisingly good timing on a repeat basis, this institution is a serial leader who is 
more likely to trade on inside information. To test this latter hypothesis, I use a Logit 
model to predict the likelihood of future M&A deals by using the previous quarterly 
holding position changes by these serial leaders. If their quarterly holding position 
changes have explanatory power in predicting the probability of future M&A 
announcements in the Logit model, then these serial leaders possess inside information 
on the actual targets.   
  
The Logit model is defined in equation (12): 
                                                 
16 This model has been widely cited to predict takeover targets in M&A literature in academia. There 
might be better models available in the industry, which I am not aware of.  
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Where, Pi is the probability of an M&A announcement in quarter t for a target firm i. 
Pi is 1 if there is an announcement in quarter t; 0 otherwise. Yi,t-j– Yi,t-j-1 is the 
quarterly change of holding positions on the target firm stocks by a certain institution 
from quarter(t-j-1) to quarter (t-j), and iε is the error term.  
 
 I estimate the logit model for each institutional investor on their quarterly 
holding positions across all target firms they hold in the M&A database. I use this 
model to identify serial leaders – the institutional investors who can consistently 
forecast the future M&A announcement and therefore accumulate target firm shares 
on a repeat basis. Then I compute the profit of the serial leaders over quarter [-6,0] and 
compare with the profit of the non-serial leaders. For model robustness, I separate the 
data into two periods: in-sample period for years before 2000 and out-of-sample 
period for years after 2000, and test whether the logit model with in-sample holding 
position changes by the serial leaders can better predict the likelihood of the out-of-
sample actual M&A deals than a naïve model which assigns equal probabilities to the 
future target firms.  
  
1.3.5 Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) 
 
Market microstructure literature views the trading process as a sequential game where 
insiders’ private information is revealed to noise traders and market makers as they 
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 update their posterior beliefs upon observed order flows. Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara 
(1997) develop a framework to extract and analyze information from the trading 
process. Following their model, Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2004) find that stocks 
with higher probability of informed trading, defined as the PIN measure, have a higher 
excess return, controlling for the Fama-French factors. Other empirical studies have 
shown that the PIN measure is highly correlated with stock return variations, the bid-
ask spread, and the cost of capital (Durnev et al (2004), Chuang and Li (2003), 
Botosan and Plumlee (2003)).  
 
In a market with institutional investors, some institutions, such as brokerage 
firms, are able to observe the submitted orders of their clients and update their beliefs 
accordingly. Other institutional investors may simply have a better information venue 
or better research skills to predict the possible takeover targets. As a proxy to measure 
the degree of information asymmetry in stock trading, higher PIN implies that a firm 
has higher probability of buying and selling orders submitted by informed traders.  
 
Since PIN is estimated based on observed daily order imbalances in the 
market, it is plausible that target firms that are in general characterized by different 
degree of information asymmetry – high PIN – will exhibit similar patterns of 
systematic front-running patterns of institutional trading.   It is also possible that the 
amount of informed trading will increase mainly due to informed trading by 
institutional investors before the M&A announcement. To distinguish the 
contemporaneous effect with prediction effect, I test two hypotheses: 
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 Hypothesis 1 Null: Institutional trading is in fact informed trading 
Hypothesis 1 Alternative: Institutional trading is not informed trading 
 
Hypothesis 2 Null: Stocks that in general are characterized by different degree 
of information asymmetry exhibit similar patterns of systematic front-running 
patterns of institutions 
Hypothesis 2 Alternative: Stocks that in general are characterized by different 
degree of information asymmetry exhibit different patterns of systematic front-
running patterns of institutions.   
 
I test the first hypothesis by sorting contemporaneous PIN17 into 10 deciles 
and examine the difference in institutional trading pattern around the event for target 
firms with high PIN. I test the second hypothesis by sorting on lagged one-year PIN 
into 10 deciles and examine whether target firms with high PIN will more likely to 
incur systematic front-running behavior by institutional investors during the event 
year. 
 
 
1.4 Results 
 
1.4.1 Abnormal Returns 
 
Figure 1.1 shows the cumulative abnormal returns for target firms that are traded by 
institutional investors on NYSE and AMEX. Interestingly, for target firms that are 
                                                 
17 The annual PIN estimates are obtained from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s website.  
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 owned, bought, and sold by institutional investors, there is no significant price run-up 
over 30 or 20 or 10 days ahead of an event day18. The random abnormal return pattern 
of target firms before the announcement implies that there is no wide-spread 
information leakage in the market prior to the M&A announcement – otherwise we 
should observe an immediate price jump to the acquiring price level.  
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Figure 1.1 CAR for target firms that are bought and sold by  
institutional investors on NYSE and AMEX over [-30,+30] 
 
Given this observed CAR pattern with no significant run-ups, an uninformed 
investor with no prior information will not buy a significant quantity of target firm 
stocks days or weeks before information becomes public. Therefore any pre-
                                                 
18 When I plot all target firms trading on NYSE and AMEX, including those that are not traded by 
institutions, there exists a price run-up of about 6% in 20 days prior to announcements.  
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 announcement significant buying orders of a target firm are suspect of trading on 
inside information. In the next section I investigate the trading behavior of 
institutional investors before and after deal announcements.  
 
If institutions are trading with significant net buying patterns, why the target 
firms do not show price run-ups? Grifin, Shu, and Topgaloglu’s (2007) show that 
individual trading is more likely to have a price impact on the target firms and their 
trading imbalances positively predict cumulative excess returns on the target firms. 
Institutions are more constrained in their trading strategies so that their trading volume 
could be small in magnitude prior to the event. This explanation is also consistent with 
my findings on the small magnitude of institutional trading abnormal imbalances, 
which only accounts for 0.5% to 2% of daily average trading volume prior to an event. 
Alternatively, the non-significant, even negative CAR of target firms owned by 
institutions suggests that institutions might be able to hide their trades more 
effectively, e.g., through algorithmic trading or breaking into smaller trades that will 
not impact prices19.  
 
1.4.2 Daily Abnormal Trading Flow 
 
Institutional abnormal trading behavior on target firms before and after M&A 
announcements reveals very interesting patterns. Figure 1.2 gives results. All 
institutional investors start to accumulate shares in target firms as far as 30 trading 
days ahead, with statistically significant buying positions starting around day (-16). 
The average institutional abnormal imbalances, as measured by the daily net buying in 
                                                 
19 The quarter-to-quarter shares change on average is 1000 shares.  
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 excess of one-year average net buying orders, have an inverted “U” shape over a [-30, 
+40] days window. Part of the shape after the initial public announcement date is 
possibly driven by the large buying orders of investment advisors, who act as merger 
arbitragers and begin to buy more target stocks from other institutions and individuals 
who are willing to sell right after the announcement. On the announcement day, most 
institutional investors (except investment advisors) immediately reverse their trading 
positions to capitalize on their prior information, a pattern that is consistent with the 
behavior of early informed investors as “short-term profit takers” described in a 
theoretical model by Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994).  
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Figure 1.2 Daily abnormal flows over M&A  
event window [-100, +100] 
 
Figures 1.3a to 1.3d shows daily abnormal flows over an event window by 
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 each type of institution. Although institutional investors are not a homogeneous group 
in terms of trading strategies, regulation rules, and information venues, I find that, 
surprisingly, they show very similar trading patterns around the event, with the 
exception of brokerage firms. Almost all institutions have abnormal buying orders 
starting 30 to 40 days prior to the announcement day. All institutions reverse their 
positions immediately on the announcement day, except for investment advisors, who 
tend to speculate on final deal consummation (merger arbitrage) in that they continue 
to buy more target firm stocks at the market price, which is lower than the acquirer 
offer price because of the uncertainty of deal success. If the deal turns out to be 
successful, merger arbitragers sell the shares at the full premium price to the acquirers.  
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Figure 1.3a Daily abnormal flows over M&A event  
window [-60, +60] by Banks 
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 Daily Abnormal Flow - Insurance Companies
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Figure 1.3b Daily abnormal flows over M&A event  
window [-60, +60] by Insurance Companies 
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Figure 1.3c Daily abnormal flows over M&A event 
 window [-60, +60] by Mutual Funds 
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 Daily Abnormal Flow - Investment Advisors
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Figure 1.3d Daily abnormal flows over M&A event  
window [-60, +60] by Investment Advisors 
 
1.4.3 Is It Inside Information or Better Models? 
 
One alternative interpretation is that institutional investors have superior models to 
predict future target firms. To test whether this interpretation is valid, I construct the 
possible rival firms of targets using the acquisition probability hypothesis test 
developed by Song and Walking (2000). The rival firm portfolio consists of rival firms 
in the same industry (four-digit SIC code) when the first M&A deal is announced after 
a dormant period of 13 months.  
 
The abnormal returns of rival firms before and after the announcement are 
consistent with past empirical results – rival firms have a huge run-up in returns due to 
 32
 market speculation before the announcement and soon revert back afterwards as the 
rumor dies out (Figure 1.4a). However, institutional investors show a significant 
pattern of selling the rival firm stocks before the announcement, as in Figure 1.4b. The 
institutional trading pattern on rival firms shows that institutional investors have a 
better information venue to anticipate the firms that actually become targets later, 
rather than to speculate on possible takeovers.  
 
 
Figure 1.4a Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Predicted Target  
Firms by Acquisition Possibility Hypothesis 
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Figure 1.4b Institutional Trading on Predicted Target Firms 
 
Are all institutional investors the same? Within each category of institutional 
investors, are there serial leaders? If some institutional investors have inside 
information on which firms will become targets in the future, they will accumulate 
holding positions in these firms several quarters ahead. If such behavior persists, these 
institutional investors are serial leaders who can consistently predict the future M&A 
targets by significantly increasing their holding positions before M&A 
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 announcements. The results of logit model by each institutional investors show that 
there are such serial leaders whose quarterly position changes have positive effect on 
increasing the probability of a firm being actual M&A target20. Table 1.1 shows two 
examples of the logit model regression results from two serial leaders: a brokerage 
firm and a bank. The first one with a brokerage firm is jointly significant with a Chi-
square value of 38.9 using likelihood ratio. The coefficient for quarterly holdings 
change from quarter (t-2) to (t-1) is significantly positive at 0.000023, which translates 
to increase the probability of future M&A announcement by 51% for every additional 
1,000 shares this brokerage firm buys over that quarter. In the second example with a 
bank's holdings, the coefficient for quarterly holdings change from quarter (t-3) to (t-
2) is significantly positive at 0.000318. Most serial leaders have similar coefficient 
estimates either from quarter (t-5) to (t-4), or from (t-4) to (t-3), or from (t-3) to (t-2). 
Consistent with my previous conjecture that brokerage firms are merger arbitragers 
and banks are not, the coefficients of quarterly holding changes from (t-1) to 
announcement quarter t show different signs for brokerage firms and banks. For 
brokerage firm, the coefficient is significantly positive, because brokerage firms are 
merger arbitragers so they still keep buying over the announcement quarter and 
afterwards (shown in Figure 1.5); while banks are short-term profit takers so the 
coefficient of quarterly holdings from quarter (t-1) to quarter t is significant but 
negative, because banks will unwind their positions immediately as the deal is 
announced. In results not showing here for brevity, the serial leaders are mostly 
brokerage firms, mutual funds and banks.  
                                                 
20 For robustness test, I separate the data into years before 2000 and out-of-sampe period after 2000. An 
out-of-sample prediction shows that the logit model with serial leaders estimates have better prediction 
power in forecasting the out-of-sample likelihood of future M&A announcements than a naïve model 
with equal probability of future M&A announcements.  
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 Table 1.1 An Example of Serial Leaders 
Name Type Variable Estimate WaldChiSq Prob>ChiSq 
BEAR, STEARNS & 
CO. INC. 4 Intercept -1.577633 1136.2559 0.00 
    Yt-Yt-1 0.000017 23.7730 0.00 
    Yt-1-Yt-2 0.000023 20.2936 0.00 
    Yt-2-Yt-3 -0.000001 0.0301 0.86 
    Yt-3-Yt-4 -0.000003 0.5702 0.45 
    Yt-4-Yt-5 0.000003 0.3208 0.57 
 
Figure 1.5 gives an example of a serial leader’s quarterly holding changes in 
some target firm before and after M&A announcements and their cumulative profits 
over the quarterly window. These two serial leaders are both brokerage firms. We can 
see the significant jump of holding positions 5 or 6 quarters ahead, and the huge 
profits these two firms make by accumulating the target firm shares early enough at a 
relatively low price and pocket the premium eventually.  
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Figure 1.5 An Example of Serial Leader's  
Position Changes before M&A 
 
Does it pay to be a serial leader? In Figure 1.6, I compute the average profit 
from all serial leaders and compare with the average profits from non-serial leaders 
(followers) over quarter window [-6,0], where quarter 0 is the announcement quarter. 
The serial leaders' average profit goes from $1,000 to nearly $700,000 over the six 
quarters, but the followers' average profit only goes from $0 to $6,500 over same 
period. The magnitudes of holding positions by serial leaders are also dramatically 
larger than others. One possible reason is the size effect where serial leaders are 
mostly large institutions and followers are small ones. This is not fully justified 
because followers include insurance companies which are in general also large in size.  
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Figure 1.6 Average Profit of Serial Leaders and  
Followers over quarter [-6,0] 
 
1.4.4 Probability of Informed Trading 
 
Probability of informed trading (PIN) is estimated by tracking on the net buying 
imbalances in the time series of a trading process. I examine the correlation between 
the probability of informed trading and institutional daily trading flows. Table 1.2 
provides the correlation table. The correlation between PIN and institutional net 
trading imbalances is -0.53, and the correlation between PIN and institutional 
ownership is -0.27. These negative correlations imply that, in general, a high 
institutional trading imbalance (net buy) or high levels of institutional ownership are 
correlated with low levels of probability of informed trading. This is consistent with 
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 the empirical fact that most institutions prefer large and liquid firms, which 
empirically have less probability of informed trading.  
 
Table 1.2 Correlation Matrix of PIN, Institutional 
Ownership Level and Daily Institutional Flow 
 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients      
 Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0           
  
PIN Ownership Daily Flow 
PIN 1 -0.272 -0.530 
    <.0001  <.0001 
Ownership   1 0.009 
     <.0001 
 
To test for the first hypothesis that institutional investors are in fact informed 
traders, I sort contemporaneous PIN into 10 deciles and plot the abnormal institutional 
trading flow over the event period for target firms with highest PIN deciles (>70%), as 
shown in Figure 1.7a. The institutional trading flow pattern for high PIN firms is very 
similar to the patterns of informed institutional trading flow shown in Figure 1.2, 
therefore I do not reject the null of the first hypothesis and concludes that institutional 
investors are in fact informed traders. Figure 1.7b shows that institutional trading for 
low PIN firms does not similar pattern as in Figure 1.2.  
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Figure 1.7a Abnormal daily net buying imbalances for 
high PIN target firms in contemporaneous year 
Abnormal trading flow of low PIN target firms
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Figure 1.7b Abnormal daily net buying imbalances for 
low PIN target firms in contemporaneous year 
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 For target firms that exhibit different degrees of information asymmetry, 
controlling for other characteristics, institutional trading patterns are surprisingly 
similar among firms that are characterized by high PIN in the year before a takeover 
event., as a test to hypothesis two, Figure 1.8a and Figure 1.8b show institutional 
abnormal daily net buying imbalances for target firms that have high and low PIN one 
year before an event. Figure 1.8a shows that institutional significant front-running 
behavior is associated with target firms that have higher PIN – a pattern that is 
consistent with institutional trading shown in Figure 1.2 – therefore I do not reject the 
null of the second hypothesis. Figure 1.8b shows that institutional trading on target 
firms with low PIN does not exhibit a similar pattern.   
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Figure 1.8a Abnormal daily net buying imbalances for 
 high PIN target firms in previous year 
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 Abnormal Flow for Low PIN Firms
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Figure 1.8b Abnormal daily net buying imbalances 
 for low PIN target firms 
 
1.5 Conclusion and Further Research 
 
To insure financial market fairness and integrity, the US Securities Act of 1934 
requires institutional investment managers with investment discretion over $100 
million or more of certain equity securities to disclose their equity holdings at the end 
of each quarter. The SEC can use this information to analyze the influence and impact 
of institutional investment managers on the securities market. However, quarterly 
reports, due to their low frequency, reveal little about the impact of institutional 
investors on the securities trading process when they enter and exit some positions 
quickly within a quarter.  
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  Campbell, Ramadorai and Schwartz (2008) develop a methodology that 
combines intraday NYSE TAQ data with institutional quarterly equity ownership 
reports to infer the high frequency daily equity holding positions of institutional 
investors. Using a similar technique, this paper investigates the high frequency trading 
behavior of institutional investors before and after M&A announcements.  
 
This paper addresses four questions on institutional trading around M&A 
announcements.  First, do institutional investors exhibit significant trading 
imbalances (buy-sell) before and after M&A announcements? Second, is the abnormal 
trading volume by institutions market participation or profit exploitation? Third, 
which types of institutional investors are more likely to learn material non-public 
information – banks, mutual funds, brokerage firms, or insurance companies?  
Fourth, how do we distinguish institutional investors inside information from their 
superior models? Can we further identify suspicious serial leaders who can 
consistently predict future M&A deals? Finally, is the significant front-running pattern 
of institutional investors associated with higher degree of information asymmetry 
among target firms?  
 
My findings are summarized as follows. First, almost all institutions build up 
net buying positions as early as 30 days before an announcement, and most of them 
(except investment advisors) immediately reverse their positions on the announcement 
day. Second, there is no market-wide information leakage prior to the event, and 
prices of target firms do not jump immediately to the level of acquiring prices, 
however, institutional investors exhibit significant net buying imbalances prior to the 
event, which implies that they are trading on private information. Third, institutional 
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 investors are not a homogeneous group in terms of trading strategies, regulation rules, 
or information venues, but, surprisingly, exhibit similar trading patterns before and 
after M&A announcements. Banks, insurance companies and mutual funds 
immediately reverse their positions on the announcement day, acting as “short term 
profit takers.”  Investment advisors (brokerage firms) are slightly different since, 
after an announcement, they tend to be merger arbitragers, continuing to buy more 
shares of target firms in order to speculate on final deal consummation. Fourth, to 
distinguish inside information from superior models, I find institutional investors 
actually sell the forecasted target firms from an acquisition probability model and only 
buy the actual future targets. Further, there exist serial leaders who can consistently 
predict the future M&A deals and accumulate shares of target firms over a five-quarter 
period before the deal is announced. The serial leaders’ holding changes have 
explanatory power in forecasting the likelihood of actual M&As by a logit model. 
Finally, using the probability of informed trading (PIN) as a proxy to measure the 
cross-sectional degree of information asymmetry, I confirm that significant 
institutional front-running behavior is associated with target firms that have higher 
PIN over same period; I also find that stocks in general are characterized by different 
degree of information asymmetry exhibit similar patterns of systematic front-running 
patterns of institutions.  
 
One caveat of this study is that daily institutional trading flow is not directly 
observed from any database, but rather it is inferred from a regression methodology 
developed by Campbell, Ramadorai and Shwartz (2008). This methodology is better 
than simple cutoff rules for distinguishing institutions from individuals in NYSE TAQ 
data, since it is more consistent with the institutional ownership report to SEC. It is 
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 also better than any proprietary dataset because it allows for a less constrained time 
period and an increased breadth of institutions it covers. But most of my findings are 
consistent with conclusions I obtain by using quarterly data. For example, the logit 
model shows that serial leaders have inside information to be able to consistently 
predict actual targets and brokerage firms act as merger arbitragers. The trading 
behavior by most types of institutions exhibit similar patterns either at daily frequency 
or at quarterly frequency around M&A announcement.  
 
However, the inferred trading flows have estimation errors and will never be 
precise. Because of this, I do not use the complementary positions in the trading 
process to represent the trading behavior of individual investors, which, once they 
become available, will constitute another interesting resource for comparing the 
trading behavior of institutions and individuals around M&A announcements. This 
methodology also excludes stocks from NASDAQ, due to difficulties in classifying 
the direction of trade. Nevertheless, it is the best methodology available so far to 
directly infer institutional trading flows from publicly available data sources.  
 
The systematic trading patterns of institutional investors I find in this paper do 
not reveal how they obtain their information before an event. Are they simply smarter, 
with better models, or with more research into target firms, or better information 
venues, or do they simply have more information due to their frequent exposure to 
management teams?21 Further detailed data is necessary to answer questions of where 
                                                 
21As a corporate advisor for M&A deals, a full service investment bank may simultaneously advise a 
corporate client on a transaction; provide or raise financing to support the transaction (either on its own 
balance sheet or by sourcing capital from clients of the bank); trade in the shares of both the bidder and 
the target; offer equity research on both the bidder and the target; provide prime brokerage to hedge 
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 they obtain their information and how that information travels. Whether what they do 
is legal or illegal is still an open question, to be answered by the SEC.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
funds and other investors wishing to trade in the shares of the bidder or the target; make a market in the 
shares of the bidder or the target, or otherwise invest its capital in trading positions that may be 
impacted by the transaction. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 
INSTITUTIONAL TRADING, INFORMATION AND 
MACROECONOMIC NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the US equity market, institutional investors are among the major players in the 
stock trading process, buying and selling stocks either as agents for their clients or as 
proprietary traders for their own accounts. In 2002, institutional holdings accounted 
for 57.9 percent of the total equity market value (Bernstein (2006)). As sophisticated 
investors with either better information venue or superior models, do institutional 
investors accumulate profitable positions before public news announcements and 
exploit market over-reaction or under-reactions afterwards? Do institutions differ in 
their trading behavior by trading strategies and fiduciary types? How do they trade 
when there is high opinion heterogeneity in the market?   
 
Using quarterly report data (13F) filed to the US SEC, past literature has 
revealed some of the trading strategies by institutional investors, such as buying large 
and more liquid firm stocks. However, the quarterly frequency will not capture any 
trading behavior within a quarter, when there are some major events that have a 
significant impact on the market, such as the announcements of corporate news or 
macroeconomic news.  This paper investigates the high-frequency trading behavior 
of institutional investors over 22 types of macroeconomic news announcements in the 
US equity market.  
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  There are three empirical papers related to this paper: Campbell, Ramadorai 
and Vuolteenaho (2005), Campbell, Ramadorai and Schwartz (2007), and Pasquariello 
and Vega (2005). The first two papers developed the CRS methodology to infer the 
institutional trading flow at daily frequency and examined institutional trading 
behavior on earnings announcements, while the third one focuses on the information 
role of macroeconomic news announcements in US Treasury bond market, without 
identifying market participants. This paper makes several additional contributions. 
First, I look at trading on market-wide news that affects the whole equity market, and 
see how the information is incorporated into price through the trading process. 
Second, I further break down the information environment by heterogeneity of beliefs 
and by private information to differentiate the trading behavior of institutions. Third, 
comparing to Pasquariello and Vega (2005), I tested the informational role of 
macroeconomic news on the US equity market through the trading behavior of 
institutions.  
 
I have three major findings: First, in aggregate, institutions do not always have 
informational advantage to make significant profits before macroeconomic news 
announcements, except in cases of certain empirically influential news like Retail 
Sales, Durable Goods Orders and Non-farm Payroll Employment. Therefore, they do 
not always trade in the right direction of market reaction. Second, institutional trading 
is highly correlated with heterogeneity in opinions about news announcements. If 
there is high dispersion of opinions among market participants before some negative 
news is released, institutions trade actively before the release of the news to make 
abnormal profits. Third, in cross-section, institutional trading is highly correlated with 
probability of informed trading, firm size and bond-like features of stocks. Institutions 
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 trade more aggressively on bond-like stocks when there is macroeconomic news since 
these stocks are more likely to react to shocks in the macroeconomic news and 
therefore create trading opportunities. For stocks that have high probability of 
informed trading, institutions trading is positively associated with the negative news 
announcement.  
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews related 
literature. Section 2.3 develops testable hypotheses based on a theoretical framework. 
Section 2.4 describes data and conducts event studies of institutional trading behavior 
on macroeconomic news announcement. Section 2.5 summarizes the results and 
checks robustness. Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
2.2 Related Literature 
 
2.2.1 Institutional Trading  
 
Past research has used quarterly levels and changes of institutional equity holding 
positions from 13F reports to measure institutional investors’ preferences over time 
and cross-sectionally in US stock market. For example, studies show that institutional 
equity holdings are positively serially correlated, and positively correlated with lagged 
stock returns over a long time period (Sias (2004), Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers 
(1995), Wermers (1999, 2000), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), Badrinath and Wahal 
(2002)). But given the low frequency of quarterly data, it is hard to interpret these 
correlations because institutions can buy or sell stocks within the quarter and we can 
not tell whether this behavior was driven by a priori private information about the 
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 news or by momentum trading in following the trend after the news announcements. 
There are other studies using proprietary datasets to measure the high-frequency 
institutional behavior. Froot, O’Connell and Seasholes (2001), Froot and Ramadorai 
(2007) and Froot and Teo (2007) used custodial data from State Street corporation; 
Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) used TORQ data; Kaniel, Saar and Titman (2004) and 
Boehmer and Wu (2007)  used Consolidated Audit Trail data from NYSE; Griffin, 
Harris and Topaloglu (2003) used trades from NYSE brokerage houses; These studies 
are difficult to replicate and their samples are restricted in their coverage of 
institutions, the time period they could investigate, and stocks they could cover etc.  
 
High frequency NYSE TAQ data has been explored to infer trading behavior 
of small or large traders in the equity market. For example, Gao (2005) studied trading 
behavior around IPO stocks lockup expiration dates. Gao and Oler (2007) studied 
trading behavior of selling target stocks before acquisition announcements. 
Shanthikuma (2004) studied trading behavior around earnings announcements of large 
and small traders, using a simple cutoff rule by trading size to categorize the investors. 
However, these studies did not categorize who initiated large or small trades.   
 
2.2.2 Macroeconomic News 
 
Modern capital market theory has suggested that any systematic factors or “state 
variables” that affect the economy’s pricing operator or influence dividends or 
complete the description of state of nature will influence stock market returns (Ross 
(1976)). Chen, Roll, and Ross (1985) investigated a set of macroeconomic variables as 
systematic risk factors priced in asset returns: term structure of interest rates, inflation, 
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 industrial production, and corporate bond default premium. Other papers have 
confirmed more influential macroeconomic variables such as PPI, unemployment, 
balance of trade, housing starts (Cornell (1983), Chen (1991), Pearce and Roley 
(1985), and Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002)).  
 
Innovations in macroeconomic variables may indicate changes in either the 
states of economy or discount factors or future cash flows, and therefore may have a 
permanent impact on the long-term equilibrium of asset prices. For example, an 
economic expansion is good but an overheated economy could lead to fear of 
inflation. If this is true, then the trading flows over the news announcements days 
should reflect the information content in the news about the changing states of the 
economy. Recent papers have used macroeconomics forecast data such as MMS to 
study the information content by abnormal trading flows around macroeconomic news 
announcements in various markets. For example, Pasquariello and Vega (2006) 
studied order flows in the US Treasury bond market; Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold 
and Vega(2003) studied order flows in the foreign exchange market; Green (2004) and 
He, Li, Wang, and Wu (2007) studied order flows in the US government bond market 
at an intraday level. These studies conclude that these markets are responding 
significantly to innovations in macroeconomic indicators over short term window. If 
we believe that markets are integrated to some degree (at least in US), then we would 
expect similar results in the US equity market.  So far there has no event study done 
on abnormal trading flows around macroeconomic news announcements days in the 
US equity market. This current paper fills the gap in the literature and focuses on the 
institutional investors trading behavior.  
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 2.3 Hypothesis Development 
 
In equity markets, heavy trading around firm-specific news is closely related to 
information asymmetry, where some investors possess a priori private information 
about the news, e.g., Merger and Acquisition announcements. In another paper I tested 
the institutional trading flows around M&A events and showed significant information 
leaks before the announcements, especially on the target firms (Li (2007)). However, 
macroeconomic news is more transparent in the sense that the release of news is a 
scheduled market event at a fixed time and no one should be able to trade profitably 
beforehand. If there were abnormal institutional trading in the direction of news a 
priori, that should indicate institutional investor have private information.  
  
In late summer 2007, investors became more concerned about mortgage-
backed investments on highly-risky sub-prime mortgages, which were causing a credit 
crunch in the US stock market. From July 16 to Aug 21, DJIA went from 13950 to 
13090, down by 6%. On Aug 24, 2007, the Bureau of Census released some 
macroeconomic news that showed increased numbers in new home sales and durable 
good orders from the previous month. The stock market bounced up immediately: 
DJIA went up by 2.3% for the week, Nasdaq by 2.9%, and S&P500 by 2.3%.  29 out 
of DJIA 30 stocks showed gains. In fact, two to three days before the macro news 
release, the market had been trading upwards.  
 
In a frictionless market, once macroeconomic news is announced, asset prices 
should adjust immediately to the new long-term equilibrium price level that 
corresponds to shocks in the news. However, in a short-horizon window, we not only 
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 see price jumps at the announcement time but also price fluctuations several days 
before and after the announcement. In a market with frictions, this behavior can be 
explained by asymmetric information among investors in the market, or by differences 
in opinions in interpreting the same information. In the stock market, it is natural to 
assume that large institutional investors usually have informational advantage over 
individual investors, either through their superior models and better information 
channels, or through their professional skills in understanding the investment 
environment. By examining abnormal buying or selling orders initiated by these large 
institutions, I can test the following hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Stock market does not react significantly to macroeconomic news, 
either good or bad news.  
 
Since the development of Arbitrage Pricing Theory (Ross (1976)), past studies 
have shown that the stock market reacts significantly to some influential 
macroeconomic news, such as PPI, unemployment rate, term structure, inflation, 
balance of trade, housing starts etc (Chen, Roll, and Ross (1986), Cornell (1983), 
Chen (1991), Pearce and Roley (1985), and Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002)). The 
US treasury bond market and the foreign exchange market both react strongly to 
innovations in macroeconomic indicators (Pasquariello and Vega (2006), He, Li, 
Wang, and Wu (2007), Anderson, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega(2003)).  
 
The financial markets’ responses to macroeconomic news are not surprising. 
Macroeconomic news is important in itself as indication of discount rate changes or 
future cash flow changes, or because it conveys information that can be used to update 
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 forecasts about other aspects of general economic and investment environment. A 
quote from BusinessWeek on non-farm payroll employment announcement states: 
“The Labor Dept's monthly roundup of job market activity has always been the 
economics report Wall Street listens to more than any other. It's a market-mover 
because of its timeliness, breadth of coverage, and its influence over policymakers at 
the Federal Reserve.”  
 
To detect any abnormal trading pattern of institutions, the definition of 
good/bad news is critical since it is related to the superior information that institutions 
may possess before the news is announced and therefore determines how the 
institutions will trade around the news. In earnings announcement event studies, the 
standard approach is to use the surprise measure, which is the standardized difference 
between actual earnings and consensus analyst earnings forecasts. If the surprise is 
positive, that is good news. Otherwise it is bad news. One reason this measure is 
widely used is that market participants closely watch the corporate earnings surprise 
measure and respond positively/negatively for companies that beat/fail to beat the 
analyst earnings forecast.   
 
In our case of macroeconomic indicators forecast, it is less clear for two 
reasons. First, in general, good news to the economy such as increase in GDP will be 
thought as good news to the stock market as well. However, the increase in GDP may 
induce the fear of rising interest rates, which is “bad” news to the stock market.  
 
In some cases, an announcement that is associated with higher stock and bond 
prices might be thought to be “good”, even if it is “bad” news to the economy. For 
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 example, stock market rises on increased unemployment which we otherwise think of 
as “bad”. Or a tightening of the Fed Funds Rate both raises bond prices (“good”) and 
lowers stock prices (“bad”). Second, it is not so clear whether most market participants 
watch the MMS forecasts as their benchmark to measure the “surprise” of news.  
 
In this paper, I tested four ways to classify good/bad news: (1) standardized 
surprises between MMS forecasts and realization; (2) monthly announcement changes; 
and (3) market abnormal return on news announcement day; (4) regression of market 
return on past surprises and monthly/quarterly/yearly changes. In fact, these four 
measures are not always in the same direction. The correlation matrix of the first three 
measures shows that in some cases, the surprise measure in (1) is in the opposite 
direction of market response measure in (3), which supports our hypothesis that the 
market does not always watch the surprise measure defined as the difference between 
MMS forecast and realization of indicators.  
 
My objective function is to maximize abnormal profits of institutional 
investors by formulating trading strategies that can forecast the market reactions on 
the release of macroeconomic news. Using the market reaction on the event day to 
determine whether the market thinks it is good or bad news is an ex-post measure, 
which helps us to understand how the equity market incorporates the macroeconomic 
news shocks into asset pricing process. However, since it is ex-post, institutions who 
may want to trade on certain stocks that react strongly to macroeconomic surprises can 
not observe the market reaction ex-ante.  Earlier studies (Cornell (1983)) have 
compared MMS forecasts with time series ARIMA forecasts and concluded that the 
MMS survey forecast errors have higher correlation with changes in asset prices than 
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 forecast errors derived from an ARIMA model do. These studies have shown that 
MMS forecasts are an unbiased measure and the forecasting errors are smaller than a 
simple ARMA model, so another choice is to use the surprise measure between MMS 
forecasts and realizations. Unfortunately this measure also suffers the ex-post problem 
because 10 days before the release of any news, the institutions can only use some 
forecasting variables, either MMS or their own model forecasts, to build up positions. 
A preliminary analysis using surprises of macroeconomic announcements shows that 
the equity market does not always respond significantly to good or bad news, in some 
cases it bounces up in both cases just as non-announcement days. So it is hard to 
justify market reactions solely based on the surprises in news, especially ex-ante.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Institutions do not have private information or better ability to forecast 
some of the good or bad macroeconomic news before it is announce, therefore they do 
not formulate profitable trading strategies. 
 
The institutions in our study are confined to five types of institutions defined 
by 13f data: (1) bank, (2) insurance company, (3) investment company (mutual fund), 
(4) investment advisors (major brokerage firms), (5) others, including pension funds 
and university endowments.  Given their size (about 60% of equity market value) and 
resources, these institutions conduct internal research using their own quantitative 
“superior” models and obtain external sources of information from sell-side analysts 
and corporate managers. In terms of “private” information that the institutions may 
possess on macroeconomic indicators, it is not inside information in the sense of 
trading individual stocks. Besides in-house technical analysis and external 
information, some institutions such as the brokerage firms are able to observe actual 
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 order flows in the market therefore extract or infer valuable information. Past studies 
have documented institutional trading lead stock returns, and firms with increased 
institutional ownership outperform firms with decreased institutional ownership by 
8.06% annually (Gibson and Safieddine (2003)). 
 
Hypothesis 3: Institutions trade less on high-information-heterogeneity days, on large 
firms, and on high-private-information (PIN) firms. There is no spillover effect from 
macroeconomic news to firm-specific news.  
 
Market microstructure literature examines how private information on specific 
stocks is incorporated into prices through the trading process. Probability of informed 
trading (PIN) can be estimated by a structural model explicitly, following procedures 
given by Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002). 
Vega and Wu (2006) showed that stock information asymmetry using measures such 
as PIN increases on macroeconomic announcement days, which suggested 
macroeconomic news and other market-wide news played an important role in the 
formation of information asymmetry. 
 
In general, if a stock has higher probability of informed trading, do institutions 
trade more or less in the stock? On days when there are unanticipated shocks in 
macroeconomic fundamentals, do high-PIN stocks react more strongly to the news 
than low-PIN stocks? I include the PIN measure in this paper to answer these 
questions.  
 
Heterogeneity in opinions simply implies that even though investors observe 
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 the same public information, they may still have different opinions or differential 
information in interpreting public news, which could lead them to initiate buying or 
selling orders in the equity market upon news announcements (Sarkar and Schwartz 
2007). Grundy and McNichols (1990) and Shalen (1993) show that dispersed opinions 
magnify the effect of noisy information on price changes. Pasquariello and Vega 
(2006) use this measure to find that when the dispersion of beliefs on macroeconomic 
news forecasts among market participants is high, the contemporaneous correlation 
between order flow and bond yield changes in US bond market is higher. This paper 
addresses whether the level of information heterogeneity in the equity market will 
affect the institutional trading behavior.  
 
On days when market participants disagree more on the direction and 
magnitude of forecasted news, there should be more trading on both buying and 
selling sides than on days when people disagree less and therefore trade in one 
direction if they are better informed traders such as institutions. We hypothesize that 
institutional trading is highly correlated with heterogeneity in opinions on 
macroeconomic news. In the cross-section, consistent with the literature, institutions 
usually prefer large stocks over small stocks. We hypothesize that institutions will buy 
large stocks most of the time whether it is good or bad news. Therefore, they may 
make or lose money depending on how the market goes. In case of small stocks, 
institutions should decrease their holdings over time, but small stocks are more likely 
the ones that institutions have private information on, so it is hard to predict whether 
they will make abnormal profits or not.  For stocks that have high probability of 
trading on private information, we hypothesize that institutions are able to trade in the 
right direction before good/bad news are announced and make positive profits in both 
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 cases. For stocks that have low probability of trading on private information, 
institutions should lose money in aggregate.  
 
2.4 Data and Methodology 
 
Four data sources are used in this study: NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ), Institutional 
Ownership (13F), CRSP, and International Money Market Services (MMS)22 from 
1993, when the 13F reports started, to 2004. NYSE TAQ and 13F data are combined 
to estimate and infer daily buy/sell order flows for institutional traders, following 
procedures described in Campbell, Ramadorai and Vuolteenaho (2005). CRSP is used 
to calculate abnormal stock returns. MMS data contains 22 major macroeconomic 
announcements. My sample includes 2837 firms that are traded in NYSE and reported 
quarterly 13f to SEC, from 1993 to 2004.  
 
My NYSE TAQ data includes all trades and quotes during normal trading time 
on common stocks and excludes all close-end funds, ADRs and REITs. I use Lee and 
Ready (1991) algorithm to classify direction of a transaction. For details on Lee and 
Ready (1991) algorithm, see Appendix A.  
 
Institutional investment managers who exercise investment discretion over 
$100 million or more must report their holdings on Form 13F with the SEC. In 
general, an institutional investment manager is: (1) an entity that invests in, or buys 
and sells, securities for its own account; or (2) a person or an entity that exercises 
investment discretion over the account of any other person or entity. Thomson 
                                                 
22 I thank Clara Vega for providing us the analyst dispersion data, which were not available in MMS. 
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 Financial distributes digital database of the institutional quarterly 13F filings and 
decomposes institutional ownership structure into five groups: (1) bank, (2) insurance 
company, (3) investment company (mutual fund), (4) investment advisors (major 
brokerage firms), (5) others, including pension funds and university endowments.  
 
CRSP daily files provided the share price, shares outstanding, exchange codes, 
stock and market returns, etc. I use CRSP PERMNO to match CRSP data to TAQ and 
13F stocks that traded on NYSE and AEMX. I use CRSP value-weighted market 
return as our benchmark to calculate abnormal stock returns around the announcement 
events. Using equal-weighted market return generates similar results. 
 
2.4.1 Daily Trading Flow of Institutional Investors 
 
NYSE TAQ database does not include information on identification of each order, nor 
distinguish buy initiated orders from sell initiated orders. Lee and Radhakrishna 
(2000) (LR) proposed a set of cutoff rules in terms of trading size in dollar term to 
separate institutions from individual trades from high frequency intraday data such as 
NYSE TAQ or TORQ. They examined the performance of several cutoff rules in the 
TORQ data set, for example, upper and lower cutoffs of $20,000 and $2,500 are most 
effective in distinguishing institutions from individual trades in small stocks. Recently, 
Campbell, Ramadorai and Shwartz (2007) (CRS) developed a regression model to 
infer the institutional net trading flows at daily level, where they combine information 
from the intra-day NYSE TAQ data and the quarterly 13F institutional ownership data.  
 
The CRS methodology is superior to simple cutoff rules in two ways: first, it 
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 does not suffer any selection bias or restrictions by using high-frequency proprietary 
database; second, it does not suffer any low-frequency problem by using quarterly or 
monthly institutional ownership data.  In this study, I used CRS methodology to infer 
intraday and daily institutional and individual trading flow. For details, please refer to 
Appendix B.  
 
The daily institutional trading flows do not show a significant rising or falling 
pattern over the entire period23, so I compute the average daily net flow over the 
whole data period as the benchmark institutional trading level for each firm. A 
common practice in earnings announcement studies is to use average returns over a 
certain estimation period, or market-beta-adjusted returns, or Fama-French three-
factor model adjusted returns as benchmarks for expected returns. However, in this 
study, macroeconomic news announcements are released monthly with a market-wide 
effect on equity trading. It is not necessary here to compute expected flow in a similar 
way, since most macro news occur at monthly frequency, using previous period 
average will automatically include abnormal trading around several same events. The 
abnormal daily institutional trading flow over event window is defined as the 
difference between daily flow and the long-term benchmark trading level:  
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23 For each firm, I ran regression of daily flow on a linear time trend. Most firms do not have significant 
time trend over time.  
 66
 Where N is the number of daily flows for firm i over the entire sample period and it 
varies among firms. I categorize the abnormal daily flow for each event day by the 
signs of macro announcements surprises, and take the average of abnormal flow for 
each event day across firms sorted by positive and negative announcement surprises: 
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Where AAFjt is the average abnormal daily flow for surprise j on event day t. Note that 
the daily institutional trading flow for firm i on day t is defined as the net buying 
number of shares divided by the total number of shares outstanding for that firm on 
day t, i.e., it is the daily net turnover ratio of a particular stock they hold. Empirical 
results showed that over a long time period, institutions have gradually increased their 
ownership in large market cap stocks, which will translate into a positive net buy 
turnover ratio in most of the days in my measure. It is of course, only a proxy for what 
institutions do in reality. In fact, some institutions such as mutual fund or pension fund 
which are more likely “dedicated” or “quasi-indexing” funds will not re-balance their 
portfolios on a daily basis (it is of course extremely expensive in terms of transaction 
cost). But they may increase their holdings on those large stocks gradually over long 
time period, sometimes just enter a long position and wait. In that case my measure of 
daily flow will be more like a daily average measure of large positions they build 
periodically. Other institutions such as brokerage firms which are more likely 
“transient” fund will focus on arbitrage opportunities to maximize profits, so they may 
buy and sell stocks more frequently and I expect to see both net buying and net selling 
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 activities over short time period.  
 
I hypothesize that institutional trading behavior differs in response to 
macroeconomic news in two ways:  
 
First, if a positive surprise is coming, institutions with priority information 
may have run-ups several days before the news release, and sell immediately after 
market has gone up to positive news therefore pocket profits by market-timing. If a 
negative surprise is coming, institutions may start to sell first, or may start to buy on 
negative news on event day, hoping to recover on the overreaction of market after the 
event.  
 
Second, the general macroeconomic condition matters. If the economy is in an 
expansion period with consecutive positive news in the near past, a piece of negative 
news, even small, will cause some turbulence in the market. For example, Aug 2007 
release of non-farm payroll figure showed small declines in construction and 
manufacturing employments, which was the first decline in four years, the DJIA 
dropped by 2% on the day of the release. Positive news in a recession period is 
likewise. There exists an asymmetry in the way that market reacts to positive or 
negative news in expansion versus recession economic period.  
 
I test the first hypothesis by sorting the standardized surprises into three 
categories: positive, zero, and negative news. Daily abnormal institutional trading 
flows and daily abnormal market returns are computed for positive and negative news 
surprises, respectively.  
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I test the second hypothesis by running a regression of sum of abnormal daily 
trading flows over event window on macroeconomic news surprises, on lagged 
macroeconomic conditions, and on interaction terms of news surprises and economic 
conditions to control for the asymmetry in responses.  
 
ittjiijtitiiijtiiijt XSURXSURY εβββα ++++= −−− 1,,31,21 ****  (4) 
 
Where, Yit is the sum of daily abnormal flow over event window [-10, +10] for period 
t for firm i. And t = 1, …, T, T is the last announcement for event j in our sample 
period. Xi,t-1 is a vector of several macroeconomic announcements that represent the 
economic condition in period t-1. Xi,-j,t-1 is the vector of macroeconomic 
announcements that excludes event j.  
 
2.4.2 Macroeconomic Data and Standardized News Surprises 
 
The International Money Market Services (MMS) Inc. collects expectations and 
realizations of macroeconomic indicators in US economy. Every week since 1977, 
MMS has conducted a Friday telephone survey of about 40 professional money 
managers, collected forecast of all indicators that to be released during the next week 
and reported the median forecasts from the survey. Previous studies such as Balduzzi 
et al (2001) have confirmed that MMS survey data are mostly unbiased and more 
consistent with forecasted variables than those from extrapolative predictions such as 
ARMA models.   
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 Table 2.1 provides a summary of 22 major macroeconomic announcements, 
reported from 1980s to 2004. Table 2.2 shows the means and standard deviations of 
both realizations and expectations of macroeconomic indicators collected by MMS.  
 
Announcement surprises are defined as the standardized difference between 
realized and median forecasts of each macroeconomic announcement, to control for 
the variation in measurement units. The standardized surprise with macroeconomic 
indicator i at time t is computed as:  
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Where is the actual announced value for indictor i,  is the MMS median 
forecast, as a proxy for market expectation, and  is the sample standard deviation 
of ( - ). Notice that the  here is quite different with the standard deviation 
of professional forecasters, which measures the dispersion in beliefs when they 
forecast a particular indicator one week ahead.  
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Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega(2003), Pasquariello and Vega (2006) 
used standardized macroeconomic news surprises to show that unanticipated shock to 
fundamentals in the economy will affect both foreign exchange rates and bond yields, 
and there exists an asymmetric sign effect – bad news has greater impact than good 
news, which relates to information processing and price discovery theories.  
 
In this paper I used this measure to test the relationship between aggregate 
equity market returns and unanticipated shocks in macroeconomic indicators, and the  
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 Table 2.1 Macroeconomic News Announcements 
 
Announcements Obs Source Dates StDev 
      
Real Activity (Monthly)     
1. Retail Sales 233 BC 2/13/1985-6/14/2004 Yes 
2. Nonfarm Payroll 234 BLS 2/1/1985-2/7/2004 Yes 
3. Industrial Production 233 FRB 2/15/1985-6/16/2004 Yes 
4. Capcacity Utilization 195 FRB 4/18/1988-6/16/2004 No 
5. Personal Income 233 BEA 2/20/1985-6/28/2004 No 
      
Consumption (Monthly)     
6. New Home Sales 195 BC 3/29/1988-6/24/2004 Yes 
7. Personal Consumption 
Expenditures 228 BEA 7/17/1985-6/28/2004 No 
      
Investment (Monthly)     
8. Durable Goods Orders 233 BC 2/26/1985-6/24/2004 Yes 
9. Factory Orders 198 BC 3/30/1988-10/4/2004 Yes 
10. Construction Spending 193 BC 4/1/1988-7/1/2004 Yes 
11. Business Inventories 194 BC 4/14/1988-6/15/2004 No 
      
Net Exports (Monthly)     
12. Net Exports 192 BEA 4/14/1988-6/14/2004 No 
      
Price Indices (Monthly)     
13. Producer Price Index 236 BLS 2/15/1985-6/17/2004 Yes 
14. Consumer Price Index 237 BLS 2/26/1985-10/19/2004 Yes 
      
Forward Looking (Monthly)     
15. Consumer Confidence Index 160 CB 7/30/1991-10/26/2004 Yes 
16. NAPM Index 162 NAPM 2/1/1991-7/1/2004 Yes 
17. Housing Starts 233 BC 2/19/1985-6/16/2004 Yes 
18. Index of Leading Indicators 233 CB 3/1/1985-6/17/2004 Yes 
      
Unemployment (Weekly)     
19. Initial Unemployment Claims 235 ETA 2/1/1985-7/2/2004 Yes 
      
GDP (Quarterly)     
20. GDP Advance 57 BEA 4/27/1990-4/29/2004 Yes 
21. GDP Preliminary 57 BEA 5/24/1990-5/27/2004 Yes 
22. GDP Final 57 BEA 6/21/1990-6/25/2004 Yes 
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 Table 2.2 Summary Statistics for MMS Data 
 
Variable  
Mean-
Actual 
StDev 
Actual 
Mean-
Forecast 
StDev 
Forecast 
Mean-
Dispersion 
StDev 
Dispersion 
Real 
Activity(Monthly)        
1. Retail Sales 0.3046 1.1343 0.3114 0.7464 0.3017 0.1581 
2. Nonfarm Payroll 137.9103 176.6946 144.5923 111.5708 41.8140 14.2120 
3. Industrial Production 0.4129 1.2843 0.4146 1.2463 0.1826 0.1347 
4. Capacity Utilization 77.2979 16.8364 77.2638 16.8207 NA NA 
5. Personal Income 0.4371 0.3581 0.3968 0.2077 NA NA 
        
Consumption(Monthly)       
6. New Home Sales 774.7231 184.5824 762.9611 169.6725 19.2697 10.2353 
7. Personal Consumption 
Expenditures 
0.4329 0.5190 0.3998 0.3809 
NA NA 
        
Investment (Monthly)       
8. Durable Goods Orders 0.5880 3.7137 0.4802 1.8248 1.0305 0.3364 
9. Factory Orders 0.3569 2.1666 0.2833 1.8957 0.4992 0.2528 
10. Construction 
Spending 
0.3259 1.1376 0.1990 0.5164 0.5866 0.5773 
11. Business Inventories 0.2443 0.3806 0.1969 0.2788 NA NA 
        
Net Exports (Monthly)       
12. Net Exports 60.2635 22.6657 59.7824 22.6360 NA NA 
        
Price Indices (Monthly)       
13. Producer Price Index 0.1528 0.4874 0.2109 0.2536 0.1297 0.0485 
14. Consumer Price Index 0.2473 0.2026 0.2611 0.1480 0.0831 0.0509 
        
Forward Looking 
(Monthly)       
15. Consumer Confidence 
Index 
100.6813 26.0192 100.4472 25.3890 1.6457 0.6086 
16. NAPM Index 52.0420 5.2218 52.0410 4.8292 0.9664 0.3031 
17. Housing Starts 1.5133 0.2451 1.5016 0.2299 0.0415 0.0381 
18. Index of Leading 
Indicators 
0.1752 0.5238 0.1559 0.4099 0.1750 0.0901 
        
Unemployment (Weekly)       
19. Initial Unemployment 
Claims 
5.7128 0.9707 5.7592 0.9851 7.9733 5.4402 
        
GDP (Quarterly)       
20. GDP Advance 2.6765 1.9747 2.3814 1.8523 0.4798 0.1696 
21. GDP Preliminary 2.8140 2.1682 2.7420 2.0610 0.3133 0.1776 
22. GDP Final 2.7980 2.2358 2.7706 2.1608 0.1279 0.0506 
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 relationship between institutional trading behavior and these shocks. I confirm that 
equity market returns react significantly to unanticipated shocks to economic 
fundamentals, such as Retail Sales, Non-farm Payroll Employment, New Home Sales, 
Consumer Confidence Index, Advance GDP, and Durable Goods Orders. Also 
consistent with our assumptions, the equity market does not always react to 
economically “good” (“bad”) news in a positive (negative) way. For example, when 
Consumer Price Index incurs a positive surprise which means higher inflation, “bad” 
news for the economy, the equity market return actually goes up. In case of negative 
surprises in CPI, which is “good” news for lower inflation, the equity market return 
goes down.  
 
2.4.3 Information Heterogeneity 
 
I use the MMS standard deviation across professional forecasters to measure 
dispersion of beliefs among sophisticated investors. The standard deviation is only 
available for 17 macroeconomic indicators, as shown in Table 2.  Following 
Pasquariello and Vega (2005), I construct monthly measures of information 
heterogeneity similarly based on 17 announcements, excluding the GDP 
announcements which are released by quarter. Initial Unemployment Claims are 
weekly measures so I average the dispersion of beliefs across four weeks to give a 
monthly figure. Then I define the monthly information heterogeneity level as a 
weighted sum of monthly dispersion across announcements, and categorized by 10 
deciles to classify days in which there was a macroeconomic announcement.  
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Where, SDt is the standard deviation of announcement j across professional forecasts 
for month t in one year, )( jtSDμ and )( jtSDσ  are its sample mean and standard 
deviation across all 17 professional forecast dispersions in month t, respectively. Then 
I categorize all monthly announcement days into 10 deciles of information 
heterogeneity based on its empirical yearly distribution, assuming that the annual 
distribution of dispersion in opinions are different. I assume that dispersion of beliefs 
remains constant between each announcement.  
 
Grundy and McNichols (1990) and Shalen (1993) show that dispersed opinions 
magnify the effect of noisy information on price changes. Pasquariello and Vega 
(2006) use this measure to find that when the dispersion of beliefs on macroeconomic 
news forecasts among market participants is high, the contemporaneous correlation 
between order flow and bond yield changes in US bond market is higher.   
 
2.4.4 Probability of Informed Trading  
 
Market microstructure literature examines how private information on specific stocks 
is incorporated into prices through trading process. Probability of informed trading 
(PIN) can be estimated by a structural model explicitly, following procedures given by 
Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996) and Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002). Vega 
and Wu (2006) showed that stock information asymmetry using measures such as PIN 
increases on macroeconomic announcement days, which suggested macroeconomic 
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 news and other market-wide news played an important role on the formation of 
information asymmetry. 
 
In general, if a stock has higher probability of informed trading, do institutions 
trade the stock more or less? On days when there are unanticipated shocks in 
macroeconomic fundamentals, do high-PIN stocks react more strongly to the news 
than low-PIN stocks? I include PIN measure in this paper to answer these questions.  
 
Data with estimated annual PIN measures of NYSE/AMEX common stocks 
from 1983 to 2001 were obtained from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s website, which were 
computed following procedures given in Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (1996) and 
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002). I form 10 portfolios each year by categorizing 
PIN estimates into 10 deciles based on cross-sectional distribution within that year. 
Then I examine the abnormal returns and abnormal institutional trading flows on each 
PIN-based portfolio around macroeconomic news announcement days.   
 
2.4.5 Abnormal Profits 
 
Institutions form positions before macro news to take advantage of market reactions in 
their favor, if they could forecast the right directions of market movement. So I 
compute simulated abnormal profits over the event window for institutions by 
multiplying their cumulative abnormal flows with daily abnormal market returns. The 
formula is as follows: 
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Cumulative abnormal flow is defined as the cumulative daily flow in excess of 
a long-run mean over entire sample period. Cumulative abnormal daily flow over any 
two-period interval [t1, t2] is calculated for positive and negative announcement 
surprises, respectively:  
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Abnormal market return over event can be defined in many ways, such as 
taking the difference between daily market return and long-run mean of market return, 
or between daily market return over event window and market return over a previous 
period such as [-120,-30] as in earnings announcement studies literature. However, 
given that the macroeconomic news announcements are released at a monthly 
frequency, using a market return over a previous period as a benchmark will be easily 
overlapping with any abnormal responses from previous announcements. So before 
the news announcements, there should be an ex-ante measure on expected market 
return conditional on the past information. I use the following multivariate ARMA 
model to compute the conditional mean of monthly market return at any given time t:  
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Where, Rt is monthly market return at time t, and time t is defined as 11th day before 
one announcement to insure event window of [-10,+10]. Before I ran this ARMA 
model, I tested the stationarity of Rt sequence by Augmented Dicky-Fuller test and it 
showed a stationary process. Rt-j is the monthly market returns of lag j, and p is the 
order of effective lags, which will be determined by BIC or AIC. SURm,t-i is the 
surprise measure of previous macroeconomic news announcements m at lag i, and q is 
the order of effective lags, which will be determined by BIC or AIC, and M is equal to 
the total number of macroeconomic announcements in a given month. Since the Initial 
Unemployment Claims are at weekly frequency and GDP figures are at quarterly 
frequency, M can be either19, 22, or 25, and T = 12*250=3000. tε is White Noise 
residual.  
 
 I use the average market return over the entire sample period as the 
conditional mean of market return, which serves as a benchmark to compute the 
abnormal daily market returns over event window [-10, +10]. It has been argued that 
in practice for short-run event studies, how you control for risk does not matter that 
much, since in a short-run event study, the amount of systematic risk on a day or two 
is tiny relative to the size of the event. For example, if the market risk premium is 8% 
per year and there are 250 trading days then the daily premium is 0.00032, or a little 
more than 3/100 of a percent a day (Bernstein Research (2006)).  
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 2.5 Results and Robustness Check  
 
2.5.1 Summary of Results 
 
The institutional daily trading behavior on macroeconomic news announcements 
depends on how we categorize the news and how we categorize the investment styles 
within these institutions.  
 
First, I categorize positive and negative macroeconomic news by the reaction 
of aggregate market index on the announcement day. So by construction, I observe a 
positive jump on good news and negative one on bad news. More interestingly, after 
the news announcements, there is a clear pattern of market overreaction to both 
positive and negative news, in almost all news events. Upon seeing a piece of positive 
news, the abnormal market return increases significantly on the event day, but over the 
next 10 days, it starts to decline gradually, which implies that the market has 
overreacted to positive news in the first place. Similarly, upon a piece of negative 
news, the market return decreases significantly on the event day but then slowly picks 
up over next 10 days, which implies that market has overreacted to negative news as 
well. Figure 2.1 shows the cumulative abnormal market return over event window 
[-10, 10] for aggregation of some influential news.  
 
In aggregate, institutions have better ability in predicting some influential news 
such as durable goods orders, retail sales, CPI, and non-farm payroll employment. 
When there is negative news they start to build up a short position several days ahead 
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Figure 2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Market Returns on Positive  
(Blue) and Negative (Red) Macroeconomic News 
 
and make profit on the news release. In positive news, the institutions seem not be able 
to make much of profits before news release; but after the news release they are able 
to profit on the market overreaction to positive news. Figure 2.2 shows the abnormal 
profits that institutions make during these influential news announcements.  
 
Second, I categorize macroeconomic news announcements by the signs of 
standardized surprises defined as the difference between MMS forecasts and 
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Figure 2.2 Cumulative Abnormal Profits on 
 Influential Macroeconomic News 
 
realizations. In this case we do not always observe a positive (negative) response to a 
positive (negative) surprise by the aggregate market. In terms of institutional abnormal 
trading, the behavior is also mixed and results in either positive or negative profits. 
There are several possible interpretations to the mixed results: first, macroeconomic 
news surprises do not have a significant impact on aggregate stock market; second, 
institutional investors do not predict well market reactions to macroeconomic news; 
third, institutional investors trade more aggressively on exploiting arbitrage 
opportunities on firm-specific news rather than on aggregate market-wide news.  
 
Past studies have shown that macroeconomic shocks significantly affect the 
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 US government bond yields (Pasquariello and Vega (2006)). Moreover, Baker and 
Wurgler’s  (2006) find that  the US government bonds co-move more strongly with 
bond-like stocks: stocks of large, mature, low-volatility, profitable, dividend-paying 
firms that are neither high growth nor distressed. Following their paper, I sort out 
these bond-like stocks and examine the institutional trading behavior on these stocks 
around macroeconomic news announcements. My findings are: first, bond-like stocks 
react strongly to shocks in macroeconomic news announcements; second, institutional 
investors trade on the reactions of bond-like stocks upon macroeconomic news to 
make abnormal profits. 
 
Institutional trading is highly correlated with heterogeneity in opinions on 
news announcements. If there is high dispersion of opinions in the news forecasts 
before it is released, when people disagree more on news, there will be lots of both 
buying and selling orders since it is harder to predict the direction of news and market 
reactions, but institutions are able to trade (either buying or selling) to exploit 
profitable opportunities, especially on negative news they make positive profits on 
highly dispersed opinions, as shown in Figure 2.3. However, on low information 
heterogeneity days when people agree most on the news, institutions tend to trade 
more around the announcement days but they fail to make a positive profit.  
 
 
In the cross-section, institutional trading is highly correlated with private 
information, firm size and bond-like features of stocks. Institutions trade more 
aggressively on bond-like stocks when there is macroeconomic news announcement 
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Figure 2.3 Institutions Abnormal Profits in High (Green) 
and Low(Red) Information Heterogeneity Days 
 
since these stocks are more likely to react to shocks in the news and therefore create 
arbitrage opportunities. Institutions tend to buy large firms and sell small firms over 
time no matter what kind of news will be released, as in Figure 2.4. For stocks that 
have high probability of trading on private information, institutions are able to always 
trade in the right direction before negative news is announced. But for stocks with low 
probability of informed trading, institutions make profits on positive news 
announcements, as in Figure 2.5.  
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Figure 2.4 Institutions Abnormal Profits with 
Large (Red) and Small (Green) Firms 
 
Figure 2.5 Institutions Abnormal Profit with High 
PIN (Green) and Low PIN (Red) Firms 
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 2.5.2 Robustness Check 
 
Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) refers to a “sequence hypothesis” where macro 
variables will be significant only if they are announced early each month, while later 
announcements would not be significant because they would add little to investors’ 
macroeconomic assessments. In my study I did not find evidence of sequential effects.  
 
If the average or expected daily flow has been on a rising pattern several weeks 
before the announcements, then my measure of abnormal trading flow will be 
contaminated in two ways: first, if the expected daily flows calculated during 
estimation period is biased upward, then it will be hard to identify the statistical 
significance of abnormal trading flow during event period; second, if there were a 
sustainable upward trending in institutional trading flow (which was confirmed by the 
upward trend in quarterly institutional ownership data ), then abnormal trading flow 
will be falsely specified as correlated with macro announcements while there should 
be no correlation.  
 
Following Monteiro, Zaman and Leitterstorf (2007), I used the following 
model to estimate the expected daily flow over estimation period: 
 
itiiit tV εβα ++= *                (10)   
    
Daily trading flow for firm i on day t, where t is over the estimation window [-120, -
31]. Using 30 days before announcement is to avoid the possibility of capturing the 
effect of announcement-driven order flow run-ups several weeks before the 
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 announcement.  
  
I use OLS to estimate the model and compute t-stat to confirm/reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no linear time trend in daily order flow. If null is rejected, I use  
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If null is not rejected, I use 
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In fact, most of the null are not rejected so I use the average of daily flows over 
estimation period for each firm.   
 
I calculate the abnormal flow in the following way for event window  
[-30, +30] for each firm:  
 
AVit = Vit – E(Vi)      (13) 
 
Cumulative abnormal daily flow over any two-period interval [t1, t2] is 
calculated for positive and negative announcement surprises, respectively:  
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 Then I use several methods to test whether the cumulative abnormal flow is 
significant over the event period.  
 
Patell’s test assumes cross-sectional independence of abnormal flows, and 
there is no event-induced change in the variance of the event-period abnormal flows. 
Standardized CAF equal to CAF divided by the standard deviation of the estimation 
period abnormal flows.  
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The test-statistic showed that the CAF is significantly different from zero.  
 
2.6 Conclusion and Discussion  
 
This paper conducts a series of event studies on the abnormal trading behavior of 
institutional investors in the US equity market before and after the release of 
macroeconomic news. Combining the NYSE TAQ intraday data with quarterly 
institutional ownership report, I inferred daily institutional trading flows (buy – sell) 
on their equity positions in 2837 firms from 1993 to 2004, I use a methodology 
developed by Campbell, Ramadorai and Vuolteenaho (2005). This methodology is 
superior to a simple cutoff rule in two ways. First, it uses public available data so it 
does not suffer any selection bias or restrictions by using a high-frequency proprietary 
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 database; second, the daily institutional trading flows are more consistent with the 
reported quarterly institutional ownership changes.   
 
With this daily institutional trading flow measure, I study their trading 
behavior around the announcements of 22 major macroeconomic indicators in US 
equity market to answer the following questions. First, do institutions have private 
information or better ability to forecast good/bad macroeconomic news before it is 
released? How do they trade when public news is released? Do they differentiate in 
their trading behavior by investment type or trading style? How do institutions trade 
when the market participants have highly heterogeneous or homogeneous opinions on 
public news forecasts? How do institutions trade in firms with high or low probability 
of informed trading?  
 
My findings are as follows. First, in aggregate, institutions do not always have 
information advantage or superior models to forecast all macroeconomic news. But in 
the case of empirically influential macroeconomic news, such as retail sales, durable 
goods orders and non-farm payroll employment, institutions accumulate positions 
before announcement days and make profits on and after the announcement days. 
Second, on days when information heterogeneity among market participants is high, 
institutions make profits especially on the release of negative shocks in news. In the 
cross-section, institutional trading is highly correlated with private information, firm 
size and bond-like features of stocks.  Institutions trade more aggressively on bond-
like stocks when there is macroeconomic news since these stocks are more likely to 
react to shocks in the macroeconomic news and therefore create trading opportunities. 
For stocks that have high probability of informed trading, institutions trading is 
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 positively associated with the negative news announcement.  
 
Future work may extend the work to general macroeconomic environments. 
How market reacts to macroeconomic news may depend on general economic 
conditions such as business cycles and economic expansion or recession period. If the 
economy is in an expansion period, good news on macroeconomic conditions is well 
expected and should have little effects on market; however, good news in a contrarian 
period may lead to a huge positive response of the market. A regime-switching 
framework of the general economy may be applied to forecast the direction of equity 
market, and how institutions obtain information in different regimes.  
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 APPENDIX  
 
Appendix A Buy and Sell Classification 
 
The TAQ database of NYSE contains trade-by-trade data pertaining to all listed stocks 
starting in 1993. However, the TAQ database does not classify transactions as buys or 
sells. To classify the direction of a trade, I used the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm. 
If the price of a trade is higher (lower) than the midpoint of the contemporaneous bid-
ask quote, the trade is classified as a buy (sell). If the two are equal, the algorithm 
classifies trades on an up-tick as buys, downtick as sells. All zero-tick trades that can 
not be identified as buy or sell, plus the cancelled trades or batched or split-up trades 
that can not be classified by Lee-Ready algorithm, are put into a separate bin of 
unclassifiable trades.  Following CRS, I categorize all buy/sell trades into 19 trade 
dollar-size bins whose lower cutoffs are $0, $2000, $3000, $5000, $7000, $9000, 
$10,000, $20,000, $30,000, $50,000, $70,000, $90,000, $100,000, $200,000, 
$300,000, $500,000, $700,000, $900,000, and $1 million. I subtract sells from buys to 
get the net order flow within each trade size bin.  I aggregate all shares traded in each 
of these dollar-size bins to daily frequency, and normalize each daily bin by the daily 
shares outstanding as reported in the CRSP database. Then I aggregate the normalized 
daily buy/sell volume to quarterly frequency. For unclassified trades, I aggregate and 
normalize the same way. The sum of buy, sell and unclassifiable turnovers is the TAQ 
measure of total turnover in each stock-quarter. Note: I excluded all stock-quarters for 
which TAQ total turnover as a percentage of shares outstanding is greater than 200 
percent.  
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 Appendix B Methodology 
 
The NYSE TAQ database does not include information on identification of each order, 
nor distinguish buy initiated orders from sell initiated orders. Lee and Radhakrishna 
(2000) (LR) propose a set of cutoff rules in terms of trading size in dollar terms to 
separate institutions from individual trades from high frequency intraday data such as 
the NYSE TAQ or TORQ. They examine the performance of several cutoff rules in 
the TORQ data set; for example, upper and lower cutoffs of $20,000 and $2,500 are 
most effective in distinguishing institutions from individual trades in small stocks. 
Recently, Campbell, Ramadorai and Shwartz (2008) (CRS) developed a regression 
model to infer institutional net trading flows at the daily level, in which they combine 
information from the intra-day NYSE TAQ data and the quarterly 13F institutional 
ownership data.  
 
The CRS methodology is superior to simple cutoff rules in two ways: first, it 
does not suffer any selection bias or restrictions by using high-frequency proprietary 
database; second, it does not suffer any low-frequency problem by using quarterly or 
monthly institutional ownership data.  In this study, I used CRS methodology to infer 
intraday and daily institutional and individual trading flow.  
 
The CRS methodology follows the steps below: 
1. Get NYSE TAQ intraday data, do a tick test as buy/sell/unclassified for each 
transaction. 
2. Group buy and sell transactions separately by dollar size into 19 bins with 
lower cutoffs: $0, $2000, $3000, $5000, $7000, $9000, $10,000, $20,000, 
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 $30,000, $50,000, $70,000, $90,000, $100,000, $200,000, $300,000, $500,000, 
$700,000, $900,000, and $1 million. 
3. Subtract sells from buys to get net order flow within each trade size bin.  
4. Aggregate all shares traded in each buy/sell/net-flow bin to daily frequency, 
and normalize each daily bin by the daily shares outstanding as reported in the 
CRSP data. 
5. Aggregate the normalized daily volume to quarterly frequency. Unclassified 
volume is done in the same way.  
 
The change in the quarterly level of institutional ownership for a stock can be 
explained by a simple regression on past changes and levels of institutional shares for 
the stock, and the total buy, sell and unclassifiable volumes during the quarter: 
 
ititSitBitUtitiit SBUYYY εβββρφα ++++Δ++=Δ −− 1,1,         (1) 
 
Where, Yit is the share of firm i that is owned by institutions at the end of 
quarter t, is the change of institutional ownership between quarter t and t-1, UitYΔ it is 
unclassifiable total trading volume, BBit is total buy volume, and Sit is total sell volume 
in stock i during quarter t (all variables are expressed as percentages of the end-of-
quarter t shares outstanding of stock i).  
 
A more generalized version that includes all 19 trade-size bins and restricts the 
coefficients on buy and sell volume to be equal and opposite would be:  
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z
ZitFZitUtitiit FUYYY εββρφα +++Δ++=Δ ∑−− 1,1,          (2) 
 
Where, Fit = Bit – Sit , and Z indexes trade size bins. Following CRS, I use the Nelson 
and Siegel (1987) exponential smoothing function to reduce the number of coefficients 
to be estimated while retaining the ability to capture the shape suggested by the 
unrestricted specifications. This method requires estimating a function ),( itvZβ that 
varies with trade size Z and an interaction variable vit, and is of the form:  
 
ττ τβ /2221/222112110201 )(]1)[(),( ZitZitititit evbb
Z
evbbvbbvbbvZ −− +−−+++++=  (3) 
Defining 
Z
eZg Z ττ ]1[)( /1 −−= and ττ τ //2 ]1[)( ZZ e
Z
eZg −− −−= , I estimate the 
function using nonlinear least squares, searching over different values of τ , to select 
the function that maximizes the R2 statistics: 
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itzittizitzittizit
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(4) 
 
I estimate the equation separately for each quintile of market capitalization 
using the level of lagged institutional ownership (Yi,t-1) as the interaction variable v.  
The standard errors are robust in presence of heteroscedasticity (White’s correction), 
autocorrelation (Newey-West), and cross-sectional correlation, following procedures 
suggested in Petersen (2007). Clustering by firms, clustering by time, and adjusted 
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 Fama-MacBeth method all gave similar results24.  
 
One drawback of this approach is that it is an aggregate measure of all 
institutional daily flows, so it can not identify the types of institutions. Thomson 
Financial 13F data provides the categorization of institutional types, so I modified the 
CRS approach to separate the order flows according to the institutional investor types 
filed by Thomson Financial. All else being equal, I estimate the following equation: 
 
tji
z
tjZiFZtjiUtjitjitji FUYLYY ,,,,,,,,1,,,, ))(( εββφγα +++Δ++=Δ ∑−  (5) 
 
For each j=1, …, 5, where j is the type of institution, )(Lφ is a lag polynomial 
to define the lagged values of tjiY ,,Δ . From the estimated parameters I infer the daily 
net trading flows for each institutional investor type, using a procedure similar to that 
used previously. For a robustness check, I add institutional types to equation (3) and 
(4) and estimate the parameters and generate institutional order flows for each 
institution type; the results are not affected qualitatively.  
 
Following CRS, I construct the daily institutional flows in a similar equation: 
 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
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z z z z
idzidtizidzidtizid
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(6) 
 
                                                 
24 When regressing changes of quarterly ownership on buy/sell/unclassified volume, I include lags of 
ownership, and try clustering by quarters and clustering by firms. The results are qualitatively the same. 
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 The assumption for aggregating daily institutional flow equation (6) up to the 
quarterly frequency equation (4) is that “the error in measured daily institutional 
ownership idε is uncorrelated at all leads and lags within a quarter with all of the right 
hand side variables in equation (6). This exogeneity assumption guarantees that the 
parameters of the daily function b01, b02, b11, b12, b21, b22 andτwill be the same as those 
estimated at the quarterly frequency.” From equation (4) I estimate the parameters and 
recover the parameters of equation (6), then finally construct the predicted value 
Ed[ ] for each stock i for each day d, as a percentage of CRSP daily shares 
outstanding. I multiply it by the CRSP daily shares outstanding to get my institutional 
daily flow measure – Daily Net Buying Dollar Imbalance. The quarterly parameters 
(ρ, φ, α and ε) are not incorporated into the daily level to avoid ad-hoc assumptions, so 
the values of these parameters are set to zero at the daily level. I repeat the same 
procedures for different institutional types and different firm sizes. 
idYΔ
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